On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 3:21:33 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 2:52:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/26/2018 11:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> Logical consistency is a relation between sentences. It's not about >>> existence. The sentences might be about the existence of something, but >>> that's different. Or the sentences may have variables quantified by >>> existential quantifiers, but that's different too. To say logical >>> consistency is needed for existence would be a category error. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> In other words: >> >> https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language : >> >> >> *As long as we think that there is some relation called ‘fitting the >> world’ or ‘expressing the real nature of the human self’ which can be >> possessed or lacked by vocabularies-as-wholes, we shall continue the >> traditional philosophical search for a criterion which will tell us which >> vocabularies have this desirable feature. But if we could ever become >> reconciled to the idea that reality is indifferent to our descriptions of >> it, and that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather >> than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary, then we >> should at last have assimilated what was true in the romantic idea that >> truth is made rather than found. What is true about this claim is just that >> languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of >> linguistic entities, of sentences.* >> >> - pt >> >> >> But what is true about the sentence, *"What is true about this claim is >> just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a >> property of linguistic entities, of sentences."*? Is it not >> correspondence with some physical events, i.e. facts? >> >> Brent >> > > > In the Rortian philosophical world of *neopragmatism* [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism ], the correspondence concept > of truth is wrong: > > "The thought was that in order for a statement or proposition to be true > it must give facts which correspond to what is actually present in reality. > This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be > distinguished from a neopragmatic conception of truth." > > A "neopragmatic conception of truth"has Rorty, Quine, Wittgenstein, ... > spins, but it's basically that language is in a pragmatic relationship with > reality. > > - pt >
Or a Rortian way to put it: Truth claims are just sentences in reference to other sentences. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
