> On 26 Oct 2018, at 23:59, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 3:14:05 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote: > > > On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 10:03:07 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 2:33:13 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote: > > > On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary > assumption. > > My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. This > assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic multiverse, and I don't mean just > ZF or ZFC but all consistent versions of pure set theory. You add assumptions > that restrict this set-theoretic multiverse to arithmetic. > > > > "Logical consistency" is likely not needed for existence. > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/ > <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/> > > I disagree. I already mentioned dialetheism and I think it's nonsensical > because it accepts the existence of objects that are not what they are. Such > "objects" are nothing. And unless you arbitrarily block logical explosion, > one inconsistency will make all ontology meaningless, even the property of > existence will not be different from non-existence. > > > > > As a practical matter though, AI and agent programmers have to deal with > inconsistent information in the world:
That is why we have a non monotonically logical layer, and can use informal languages, and informal proof. That is interesting for applied AI, including application to human science, but can be distracting for fundamental inquiry, where, by Gödel machines are warned that they will need some non monotonically layer, but we take simple machine which does not need it, to extract physics from arithmetic in the self-referential way imposed by Mechanism. Bruno > > https://www.hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2013/632319/ > https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.02851 > https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0004370216300108 > https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-25664-6_46 > ... > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
