On 10/27/2018 1:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 2:52:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



    On 10/26/2018 11:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

        Logical consistency is a relation between sentences.  It's
        not about existence.  The sentences might be about the
        existence of something, but that's different.  Or the
        sentences may have variables quantified by existential
        quantifiers, but that's different too.  To say logical
        consistency is needed for existence would be a category error.

        Brent


    In other words:

    https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language
    <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language>
    :


    /As long as we think that there is some relation called ‘fitting
    the world’ or ‘expressing the real nature of the human self’
    which can be possessed or lacked by vocabularies-as-wholes, we
    shall continue the traditional philosophical search for a
    criterion which will tell us which vocabularies have this
    desirable feature. But if we could ever become reconciled to the
    idea that *reality is indifferent to our descriptions of it,* and
    that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather
    than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary,
    then we should at last have assimilated what was true in the
    romantic idea that truth is made rather than found. What is true
    about this claim is just that*languages are made rather than
    found, and that truth is a property of linguistic entities, of
    sentences.*/

     - pt

    But what is true about the sentence, /"What is true about this
    claim is just that languages are made rather than found, and that
    truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences."/?  Is
    it not correspondence with some physical events, i.e. facts?

    Brent



In the Rortian philosophical world of *neopragmatism* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism ], the correspondence concept of truth is wrong:

"The thought was that in order for a statement or proposition to be true it must give facts which correspond to what is actually present in reality. This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be distinguished from a neopragmatic conception of truth."

A "neopragmatic conception of truth"has Rorty, Quine, Wittgenstein, ... spins, but it's basically that language is in a pragmatic relationship with reality.

I'm well aware of pragmatism.  I just doubt that by A= /"What is true about this claim is just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences."/ he meant that A is in a pragmatic relationship with reality/. / That's what Donald Trump's statements have"A pragmatic relationship with reality." aka "Convenient lies".

Brent
//

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