On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 10:27:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 27 Oct 2018, at 22:59, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 3:21:33 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 2:52:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/26/2018 11:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> Logical consistency is a relation between sentences. It's not about >>>> existence. The sentences might be about the existence of something, but >>>> that's different. Or the sentences may have variables quantified by >>>> existential quantifiers, but that's different too. To say logical >>>> consistency is needed for existence would be a category error. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> In other words: >>> >>> https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language >>> : >>> >>> >>> *As long as we think that there is some relation called ‘fitting the >>> world’ or ‘expressing the real nature of the human self’ which can be >>> possessed or lacked by vocabularies-as-wholes, we shall continue the >>> traditional philosophical search for a criterion which will tell us which >>> vocabularies have this desirable feature. But if we could ever become >>> reconciled to the idea that reality is indifferent to our descriptions of >>> it, and that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather >>> than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary, then we >>> should at last have assimilated what was true in the romantic idea that >>> truth is made rather than found. What is true about this claim is just that >>> languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of >>> linguistic entities, of sentences.* >>> >>> - pt >>> >>> >>> But what is true about the sentence, *"What is true about this claim is >>> just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a >>> property of linguistic entities, of sentences."*? Is it not >>> correspondence with some physical events, i.e. facts? >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> In the Rortian philosophical world of *neopragmatism* [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism ], the correspondence >> concept of truth is wrong: >> >> "The thought was that in order for a statement or proposition to be true >> it must give facts which correspond to what is actually present in reality. >> This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be >> distinguished from a neopragmatic conception of truth." >> >> A "neopragmatic conception of truth"has Rorty, Quine, Wittgenstein, ... >> spins, but it's basically that language is in a pragmatic relationship with >> reality. >> >> - pt >> > > Or a Rortian way to put it: Truth claims are just sentences in reference > to other sentences. > > > Truth claims, yes, and gossip. But we can also bet on a reality making > sense of the sentences, and if we want to progress build from what we can > agree on, (even if we interpret it differently). If not, we will fall in > relativism, which is inconsistent at the start, as it asks us to relativise > relativism, which needs some absolute. > > Bruno > >
Instead of relativism, philosophers talk of *perspectivism*. (Nietzsche is said to be the father of perspectivism. I say, actually, Kant. ...) A Scientist sees a bunch of phenomena (recorded as data) and says, I have written a theory θ in a language λ that models the data!. Other Scientists say, I have done the same, but mine's "better"! So then there are a bunch of θ_λs (perspectives). The odd thing is that each Scientist talks about their pet θ_λ as being the world-as-it-is. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
