On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 10:27:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 27 Oct 2018, at 22:59, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 3:21:33 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 2:52:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/26/2018 11:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> Logical consistency is a relation between sentences. It's not about >>>> existence. The sentences might be about the existence of something, but >>>> that's different. Or the sentences may have variables quantified by >>>> existential quantifiers, but that's different too. To say logical >>>> consistency is needed for existence would be a category error. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> In other words: >>> >>> https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language >>> : >>> >>> >>> *As long as we think that there is some relation called ‘fitting the >>> world’ or ‘expressing the real nature of the human self’ which can be >>> possessed or lacked by vocabularies-as-wholes, we shall continue the >>> traditional philosophical search for a criterion which will tell us which >>> vocabularies have this desirable feature. But if we could ever become >>> reconciled to the idea that reality is indifferent to our descriptions of >>> it, and that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather >>> than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary, then we >>> should at last have assimilated what was true in the romantic idea that >>> truth is made rather than found. What is true about this claim is just that >>> languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of >>> linguistic entities, of sentences.* >>> >>> - pt >>> >>> >>> But what is true about the sentence, *"What is true about this claim is >>> just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a >>> property of linguistic entities, of sentences."*? Is it not >>> correspondence with some physical events, i.e. facts? >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> In the Rortian philosophical world of *neopragmatism* [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism ], the correspondence >> concept of truth is wrong: >> >> "The thought was that in order for a statement or proposition to be true >> it must give facts which correspond to what is actually present in reality. >> This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be >> distinguished from a neopragmatic conception of truth." >> >> A "neopragmatic conception of truth"has Rorty, Quine, Wittgenstein, ... >> spins, but it's basically that language is in a pragmatic relationship with >> reality. >> >> - pt >> > > Or a Rortian way to put it: Truth claims are just sentences in reference > to other sentences. > > > Truth claims, yes, and gossip. But we can also bet on a reality making > sense of the sentences, and if we want to progress build from what we can > agree on, (even if we interpret it differently). If not, we will fall in > relativism, which is inconsistent at the start, as it asks us to relativise > relativism, which needs some absolute. > > Bruno > >
Instead of relativism, philosophers talk of *perspectivism*. (Nietzsche is said to be the father of perspectivism. I say, actually, Kant. ...) A Scientist sees a bunch of phenomena (recorded as data) and says, I have written a theory θ in a language λ that models the data!. Other Scientists say, I have done the same, but mine's "better"! So then there are a bunch of θ_λs (perspectives). The odd thing is that each Scientist talks about their pet θ_λ as being the world-as-it-is. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
