> On 3 Dec 2018, at 12:24, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 5:05:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show 
> that this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Since Matter (a material computer) can compute Mechanism, I don't see how 
> Mechanism contradicts Materialism.


A material computer can emulate a computation supporting a person relatively to 
us, but with mechanism, a person cannot distinguish (without observing details) 
any computations leading to its local state, and so physics, and the appearance 
of matter can only be given by a statistics of all computation leading to that 
state, and structured by the ability of a machine to refer to itself.

Read my papers, I explain all this, or tell me at which step of the 8th step 
you have problem with. 





> 
> One could of course "eliminate" Matter in an Idealist metaphysics, but one 
> can (more plausibly to many) eliminate Numbers.

If you can understand the arithmetical definition of computation (Gödel, 
Church, Kleene), and if you are open to the digital mechanist thesis, then you 
can understand it will be easier to explain the appearances of the physical 
from the numbers, than to explain consciousness in term of material relation, 
and what those could be?

But all what I have done is providing the way to test all this, and what we 
observe till now rather confirm mechanism, and not materialism.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> 
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