> On 28 Nov 2018, at 00:44, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> 
> >>My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish 
> >>claims (matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic alone 
> >>can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information) I ask you 
> >>to actually do so.
>  
> > You ask me to implement those computation in the physical reality.
> 
> All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method. 


I do, which is not so frequent in theology and metaphysics those days.

You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real by 
“physically real”, and then asking me the impossible task to transform a 
computation realised in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical 
reality. The only way to do that is to implement a universal machine (a 
mathematical being) into the physical reality.

The whole point is that this physical reality is not necessarily primary, and 
that it is an appearance emerging from the first person indeterminacy of any 
universal machine respectively to the set of all computations.

You just mock the argument at the start by invoking your personal metaphysical 
belief. That is not valid.




>  
> > That has nothing to do with the fact that all computations are implemented 
> > in the “block-univers”, or better “block-mindscape” associate to arithmetic.
> 
> All that is just a fancy way of saying you don't need no stinking scientific 
> method. You like definitions so I will give you two, the multiverse as a 
> collection of all real universes and a real universe is one capable of 
> producing a working Turing Machine.

All terms are used in too fuzzy way here. The arithmetical reality produces all 
working machines, and indeed all of their works. You can’t use work like "real” 
when doing metaphysics with the scientific method.





>   And there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce 
> it.

I guess you mean to produce it physically, which means that you are using the 
criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle. No problem, but then you 
need to abandon mechanism, or to explain us what in “real matter”  is both 
Turing emulable (as it should with mechanism), yet not emulated in arithmetic, 
which would violate Turing completeness of arithmetic, indeed of its tiny 
initial sigma_1 segment.
That makes no sense.



> Neither you or Mr.Kleene or Mr.Robinson or anybody else has ever shown that a 
> working Turing Machine can be produced without using matter that obeys the 
> laws of physics and they haven't even come close to doing so.


They start from that. They are not doing metaphysics, nor physics. It is a 
standard theorem in all mathematical textbook that Robison arithmetic is Turing 
complete. If a sigma_1 relation is true, RA proves it, and that proofs can be 
translated in arithmetic and is associated to a computation done in arithmetic. 
You just show that you have no clue what computability theory is. 



> 
> > That is the usual interest form of pseudo-regions behaviour.
>  
> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that 
> one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

You repeat this again, which might show that you are not aware of your 
prejudices. But your older post does not confirm this. 

Do you commit yourself or not in a primary physical universe? That is what I 
called the Aristotelian Theology. The first “God” of Aristotle is the “first 
mover”, the one who gave the initial “impulsion”, and plays no other role. The 
second God of Aristotle is Matter. An irreducible substance which essence 
implies its existence, which is a way to say that it does not come from 
something else, which departs a lot from Plato’s types of conception of reality.


>  
> > my “outlandish” statements are just part of any course in computer science.
> 
> BULLSHIT!  Try peddling your ideas in Silicon Valley, talk to a venture 
> capitalist about funding it, You'd be laughed out if town!  


You have not yet begun to criticise my ideas (actually, the Löbian machine’s 
idea). You criticise (without realising) the mathematical work of Turing and 
others on which the Silicon Valley already relies.




> 
> > I have been asked both in Brussels and Lille to withdraw those explanations 
> > as it was judged to be well known.
> 
> The stuff you're correct about is not original and the stuff that's original 
> is not correct.

You seem to repeat a common slogan. Good. Usually this is not done publicly. 
Do you get money for this?





>  
> > You are not criticising me, you are criticising the whole of computer 
> > science.
> 
> Tell that to the Billionaires in Silicon Valley, they'll cry all the way to 
> the bank.
> 
> >> I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the 
> >> English language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually make 
> >> a calculation or encode some information without using matter that obeys 
> >> the laws of physics.
> 
> > The number (2^4)*(3^5) typically encodes the list (4, 5),
> 
> Do you know of a way that large Godel number can be un-encoded to get back 
> the 4 and 5 without doing any calculations?


No of course. The point is that infinitely many of those calculations are 
realised in virtue of true relations of the type 2+2=4.

You are the one saying that computationalism is true, but that only a special 
universal number counts.
But how could a universal machine distinguish if she is run by x, y or z? 
It might be that some special universal numbers play a big role in our local 
geographies, but you would need some magical ability for any u to make a 
computation more conscious than another. 

The notion of primary matter is a notion of metaphysics. Not physics. But you 
seem to deny a mathematical fact, by referring to your ontological commitment. 
That is not valid.






> If not then you must know of a way to make calculations without matter that 
> obeys the laws of physics. You should tell the Silicon Valley  people 
> immediately.
> Just kidding, save yourself the humiliation.   
>  
> > In metaphysics, when done seriously with the scientific attitude,
> 
> Metaphysics with the scientific attitude is a contradiction in terms, like 
> jumbo shrimp or brilliant stupidity.


That is what Al gazhali told to Averroes, leading Islam into obscurantism (a 
theological mistake already done by the christian, even the taoïst, …).

Let us keep metaphysics in the hand of the con man.

It is because you have no humility at all with respect to the fundamental 
question that you want it out of the scientific method.

You just take physicalism for granted, and use only insult, dismissive 
allusions, … like if you were sincerely unable to doubt the Second God of 
Aristotle. 

I will explain step 1 —> step 8 to Grayson. Feel free to take the opportunity 
to make “your refutation” maybe understandable?




> 
> > How can you lack so much sense of rigour.
> 
> At least I'm rigorous enough to know who the referent is when I use personal 
> pronouns. You should try it sometime.

 I think we have already shown more than one time that your use leads to 1 = 2, 
that is 0 = 1.




>  
> >The FPI is that you are maximally ignorant of the future experience that you 
> >(the you here and now in Helsinki, say) will *live* after pus-hing on the 
> >button.
> 
> If that is how the personal pronoun "you" is defined then "you" will not live 
> in the future regardless of if the button is pushed or not because the here 
> and now will not exist in the there and then,

If the here and now will not exist in the here and then, then you die, but you 
agreed that you survive, and that both copies will live a first person 
experience confirming that surviving. We agreed that both the HM-guy and the 
HW-guy are digne continuation of the H-guy, and are both the H-guy, just put 
simultaneously in different context. One confirms the W of the “W v M” 
prediction, the other confirms the M of the “W v M” predictions, both 
understand that “W & M” is true in the 3-1-view, but admit that their now 
personal experiences could not have been predicted when “he” was in Helsinki, 
with “he” designing any of the copies.




> and so "you" won't either. If that is what the word means then "you" has died 
> a billion time a second since birth. And I'm suposed to be the one lacking 
> rigour? You can't even keep simple personal pronouns straight!!
> 
> > So, how could a universal machine distinguish a reality emulated by a 
> > program emulated in arithmetic, and a program emulated by your god?
> 
> How could God or any intelligent entity know what the hell you're talking 
> about?


It is a version of the brain in the vat problem, taking into account that you 
cannot write a program capable of determining which universal program run it, 
by some change in its experience (it is a different question and answer if you 
let the machine having observable clues).

You need to study Gödel’s 1931 paper. You need to study the arithmetization of 
metamathematics.



>  
> >What in “matter” plays the role of not being able to be emulated in 
> >arithmetic.
> 
> Intelligence needs change. Matter can change in both time and space. 
> Arithmetic can change in neither.
>  
> >>To hell with consciousness!
> 
> > That its Dennett, or Churchland conclusion. Let us just deny consciousness.
> 
> I don't deny consciousness I'm just tired of hearing about it if nobody has 
> anything interesting to say.


Of course. If you bet on computationalism and stop at step 3, you miss the 
whole spectacular coming back to Plato and the Mystical Machine ... 




> First things first, before you have even a hope of understanding 
> consciousness you're going to have to understand how intelligence works, 
> until then you're just wasting time spinning your wheels.

On the contrary, consciousness, as you have often said, is much simpler than 
intelligence (in your competence sense). 

But simpler does not meant trivial. And indeed it is not trivial that all 
universal number “looking inward”, or “reasoning on themselves” discover the 
main modes of self-reference true, assertable, knowable, observable and 
sensible, and that three of them split in two, etc. Consciousness corresponds 
there to something which from the machine point of view is immediately true, 
knowable, indubitable, yet non assertable, nor definable.

Competence has almost nothing to do with consciousness, but growing competence 
can benefit from consciousness, which happens to be an (transfinitely powerful) 
accelerator of computation and proofs. That comes again from result by Gödel 
and others (Blum and Blum).






>  
> >>Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
> 
> >No.
> 
> No? NO! Are you joking? Are you serious?

He explained how to use matter to implement digital computations. But he is 
among those who will show that they are implemented in arithmetic, and indeed 
in tiny fragment of it. Also.

In the context of the quote, that use of matter was referring to some primitive 
matter implicitly.




> 
> > He showed how a person can be attached to a computation,
> 
> I have no idea what you mean. Do you?

If you were interested, you would have at least read one paper. 

I explain with as much details you ask how, not only a person is related to 
some computation, but why such a person has a theology, including the physics, 
making mechanism experimentally tested. I have believed in the superposition of 
state much before I even knew anything,g about quantum physics. The 
“many-world” aspect of reality is “trivial” in arithmetic: all halting 
computations provably exists in the sigma_1 arithmetical reality. Once you get 
that all machines are unable to determine “their” computations/histories, and 
the FPI resulting from that, you can grasp easily that physics becomes a 
measure on computational histories.




>  
> > and also that physics is Turing complete,
> 
> If something is Turing Complete then it is capable of behaving intelligently 
> and matter that obeys the laws of physics is the only thing that has been 
> proven to be Turing Complete.


The 3-body problem is Turing complete, although not in a practical way. Yet, it 
means that you can simulate a quantum computer, or an entire galaxy, just by 
using three bodies and Newton’s law.

And of course, nobody in that galaxy could guess that they are implemented in a 
three body universal machinery!

Tiny fragment of arithmetic is Turing complete, so it can emulate a classical 
three-body problem emulating the entire galaxy, etc.

Matter has not been proved Turing complete; but some sub theory of physics are 
Turing complete, like the billiard-variant, and of course electronic. 

But you are dead wrong than only them exist. In mathematics, many sigma_1 
complete structure arise, even if people prefer the sigma_0, and learn to live 
with set of much higher complexity, like the sigma_2 and PI_2 complete set. 

Recursion theory is the study of the arithmetical degrees of non solvability. 
The sigma_1 set are the recursively enumerable set, which can be seen as a 
variant of computability notion. The corresponding Church-Turing thesis has 
been given by Post (before Church and Turing) and Kleene (after).

I decided to study mathematics instead of biology, because, as I illustrated 
with my “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”, recursion theory does answer 
the conceptual question, of self-reproduction and semf-rerefence, solved 
intuitively by the DNA-proteine-cytoplasme relation. 




> People can get sloppy in their language snd say things like "Conway's Game of 
> Life is Turing Complete" but what they really mean  is when a computer made 
> of matter that obeys the laws of physics is programed with Conway's rules it 
> is theoretically capable of computing anything that can be computed. But 
> Conway's rules never change and so by themselves can't DO anything.

That is revisionism. You impose your metaphysical opinion to others. You 
literally confuse people. The game of life is Turing Complete *is* an 
arithmetical truth, and indeed even provable by PA.

To say that something is real because it is physical is like saying something 
is real because my God has decided.

And you might be true, but then the Indexical Digital Mechanism has to be 
rejected. And the evidences sides with it, not against it.




>  
> > so that we can use matter to implement computations, like nature plausibly 
> > does. But it is not matter which behave intelligently: it is the person 
> > associated to the computation,
> 
> There may not be a person involved, the computer might be programed by 
> another computer, and even if there is a person is made of matter.
>  
> >You use of matter is “magical”.
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean by “magical”, if you mean the brute fact that 
> terminates a chain of "why?" questions than I agree magic exists. 

You really believe that the existence of matter is in its essence. 

You are Catholic. They needed that too for making the Chirstus Corpus into 
bread.

In my theory, which is only the universal machine’s one, we don’t assume 
primitive matter. 



>  
> > Matter can be sued to implement computations relatively to us, but that 
> > does not contradict that matter is an emerging phenomenological patter 
> > arising from the number relations,
> 
> Arithmetic says that 2+2=4 for one and only one reason, because 2 matter 
> particles and 2  more matter particles behave like 4 matter particles.

Assuming Aristotle second Gods. The point will be that It does not exist 
ontologically when we assume mechanism.


> That's why a simple mechanical calculator can do arithmetic but arithmetic 
> can't do a simple mechanical calculator. 


I stop here because this is too much sad to hear.

If you cannot understand that a tiny part of the arithmetical reality emulates 
*all* computations (assuming Church-s thesis of course), you will be stuck in 
step 7. I guess you have already understand step 3 after all. 
You need to understand that mathematics is a science, and to not confuse the 
human theories about it with the reality behind it. 

Bruno


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