On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote: > > > > On Saturday, December 15, 2018, <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable. >>>>> But you ignore that what is false is also provable. Provable is only >>>>> relative to axioms. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not? >>>> >>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove >>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not? >>>> >>>> >>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs, >>>> and axioms? >>>> >>>> >>>> What do you think it tells us. Does it tell us that a false axiom will >>>> not allow proof of a false proposition? >>>> >>> >>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from >>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them >>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they >>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject >>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth. Similarly, we >>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set >>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way >>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and >>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc. >>> >>> >>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", meaning >>> that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine. Remember a >>> Turing machine isn't a real device. >>> >> >> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of >> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and >> space and time)? AG >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >> -- > > > The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary. >
*If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime. So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence, they're imaginary. QED. AG * > > Then read the paper. > > Jason > > > > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
