On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 8:06 PM <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 1:41:08 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018, <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are
>>>>>>>> provable.  But you ignore that what is false is also provable.  
>>>>>>>> Provable is
>>>>>>>> only relative to axioms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
>>>>>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth,
>>>>>>> proofs, and axioms?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom
>>>>>>> will not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from
>>>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute 
>>>>>> them
>>>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they
>>>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject
>>>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we
>>>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set
>>>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical 
>>>>>> way
>>>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial 
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth",
>>>>>> meaning that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.
>>>>>> Remember a Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of
>>>>> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and
>>>>> space and time)? AG
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime
>>> illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime.
>>> So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence,
>>> they're imaginary. QED. AG *
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>> Imaginary mean exists only in imagination.
>>
>> Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation
>> run on a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that
>> computer and alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be
>> located in spacetime.  But clearly this computer and alien civilization
>> does not exist only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads
>> with which to imagine them.
>>
>
> *If you insist on asserting something, anything, exists, but not in
> spacetime, you have a huge burden of proof since it's impossible to prove
> your assertion by any empirical test. So, you're not dealing with a
> scientific hypothesis, since it can't be falsified. AG *
>
>>
>>
It can be falsified. I think you missed the posts I wrote in response to
John.  The basic idea is this:

Theories predict certain observations.  We can check for those
observations.  If we find them, the theory has passed a test. If we don't
find them we keep looking. If we find observations that contradict the
predictions of the theory, then we reject that theory and look for
something better.

Jason

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