# Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```> On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:12, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 5:00:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net <javascript:>>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.
> >>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is
> >>> proved.
> >> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)
> >> So in this case proof entails truth??
> > But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p)
> > -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s
> > beweisbar.
> >
> > The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G*
> >>> \ G.
> >>>
> >>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In
> >>> fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.
> >>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.
> >> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for
> >> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is
> >> undefinable)?
> > No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth
> > you want, like “1 = 1”.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which
> >> []<>t -> <>t is false?
> > You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and
> > indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this
> > provability and consistency referred to.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>>
> >>>> Nothing which is proven can be false,
> >>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable.
> >> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.
> >> But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.
> > Explain this to your tax inspector!
>
> I have.  Just because I spent \$125,000 on my apartment building doesn't
> mean it's appraised value must be \$125,000 greater.
>
> >
> > If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are
> > false.
>
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises.
>
> >
> > Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no
> > one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic,
> > which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it
> > cannot prove its consistency.
>
> But it can be proven in bigger systems.
>
> > Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency,
> > quite the contrary.
> >
> > Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove
> > (easily) its consistency.
>
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.
> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
> I have read in various texts that at some point matter (all there is in the
> universe) may reach a point of inconsistency: All matter itself would just
> disintegrate.  That's all, folks!```
```
That is what Black-Holes are in Newton physics, and they appear if any two
masses are at distance 0 of each other. The *quantum* black hole are attempts
by nature to survive God’s dividing number by zero!

With Mechanism we have partial control. It is up to us to try not dividing by
zero and multiplying by the infinite. But we can’t control all bugs (security)
without losing Turing universality (liberty).

Matter will remain apparent, but its semantic will differ, as it is a mix of
contingent with what is observable for all universal
number/machine/combinator/…

With (indexical, digital) Mechanism, that is mainly the classical
Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis, the physical reality is phi_i independent. It
should imply the structure on which a measure one exist, may be like Turing
universal groups (like the unitary groups). With mechanism, the origin of the
physical laws is ia problem in mathematics, and partial solution already
obtained compare well with the general data of contemporary physics. Major
advantage: the Gödel-Löb-Solovay split of G and G* (the truth on “me” and what
I can justify on “me”) allows to distinguish, in the observable, the
justifiable and the non justifiable, but also the knowable and non knowable,
the observable and the non observable, and this is used to distinguish the
quanta and the qualia in the sensible realm.

For the universal machine there is a rich corona in between the rational
(justifiable) and the surrational (true but non provable) and the Lobian
machine (those knowing that they are universal) are aware of that corona in the
first person (non justifiable nor even describable) way.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout