On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 9:24:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. >>>>> >>>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p >>>>> is proved. >>>>> >>> So []([]p -> p) -> p or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is >>>>> true) So in this case proof entails truth?? >>>>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p >>>>> -> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = >>>>> Gödel’s >>>>> beweisbar. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will >>>>> belong to G* \ G. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being >>>>> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. >>>>> >>>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of >>>>> inconsistency. >>>>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae. Are you asserting >>>>> them for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though >>>>> "true" >>>>> is undefinable)? >>>>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any >>>>> obvious truth you want, like “1 = 1”. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition >>>>> for which []<>t -> <>t is false? >>>>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent >>>>> (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too >>>>> which >>>>> this provability and consistency referred to. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Nothing which is proven can be false, >>>>> >>>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable. >>>>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine. You just assume it for >>>>> arithmetic. But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. >>>>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! >>>>> > >>>>> > I have. Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building >>>>> doesn't mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. >>>>> >>>>> ? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >> >>>>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories >>>>> are false. >>>>> > >>>>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. >>>>> >>>>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not >>>>> mean anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* >>>>> arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, >>>>> then it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than >>>>> arithmetic, but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test >>>>> Mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of >>>>> arithmetic, as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s >>>>> consistency >>>>> in arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic >>>>> is >>>>> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. >>>>> > >>>>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. >>>>> >>>>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need >>>>> to assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich >>>>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure >>>>> more >>>>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, >>>>> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and >>>>> even in the infinity axioms. >>>>> >>>>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the >>>>> use of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their >>>>> descriptions and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot >>>>> even >>>>> secure the finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one >>>>> the system is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson >>>>> Arithmetic is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. >>>>> We >>>>> know now that we understand about nothing on numbers and machine. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s >>>>> consistency, quite the contrary. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to >>>>> prove (easily) its consistency. >>>>> > >>>>> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a >>>>> contradiction. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is >>>>> inconsistent. The proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. >>>>> >>>>> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there >>>>> is standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA >>>>> would prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A >>>>> is equivalent with proving (A & ~A), which []f, interpreted at the >>>>> meta-level. Now, for the machine, []f is consistent, as the machine >>>>> cannot >>>>> prove that []f -> f, which would be her consistency. G* proves <>[]f. >>>>> >>>>> It is because the domain here is full of ambiguities, that the logic >>>>> of G and G*, which capture the consequence of incompleteness are so >>>>> useful. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In writing [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/ ], the idea at >>>> the beginning and now is that math and matter (code and substrate, myth >>>> and >>>> hyle, ...) are married like yang and yin. >>>> >>>> After reading Galen Strawson, and a few more recent "panpsychists" >>>> coming along - that there are psychical (experiential) states of matter >>>> (in addition to physical states) is the best understanding of >>>> consciousness >>>> we have so far - tips the balance towards matter's role as "head of the >>>> household" (so to speak). >>>> >>>> >>>> I will take this seriously the day someone provide just one evidence >>>> for Matter (not matter). Until this is provided, I feel that it is an >>>> empty >>>> speculation which has been used as a simplifying hypothesis in the Natural >>>> Science, useful as such in physics, but should not be taken as granted >>>> when >>>> we do metaphysics, unless experimental evidence. >>>> >>>> It is important to understand that there are no evidences for primary >>>> matter (Matter), only for matter. >>>> >>>> Once you grasp that all computations are realised in arithmetic, that >>>> is enough for not taking Matter from granted in mechanist >>>> philosophy/science. Unless a proof is given that Nature does not conform >>>> toi the reducible notion of Nature entailed by Mechanism, Matter (with the >>>> big M) will remain an unclear philosophical speculation, and it should not >>>> be used as a dogma, as this is no more science. >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> If one *begins* with the assumption >>> >>> *Fictionalism* >>> >>> >>> >>> But why start from a so much nonsensical assumption? Why not assume that >>> pigs have wings. >>> >>> How to distinguish 2+2=4 and 2+2=5 with fictionalism? >>> >>> I certainly doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the moon, as I >>> explained before. >>> >>> >>> >>> then *Matter is All There Is* is the best conclusion from that >>> assumption (I would argue). >>> >>> >>> But why assume (primary) Matter? I will wait for at least one evidence. >>> “Seeing” is not an evidence (that is Aristotle’s criteria for reality). >>> >>> To explain the apparent matter from an ontological commitment is not >>> better than saying “because god decided”. It eliminate problems, without >>> providing any testable consequence. >>> >>> >>> >> >> But I wasn't assuming Materialism. >> I was assuming Fictionalism. >> >> Fictionalism says *Numbers don't exist.* >> If something exists (and it can't be numbers) then what is the >> alternative? >> >> Matter seems like the best bet, right? >> > > > Except that with Mechanism, it is has be proven, or explain, that Matter > cannot be a primary notion. With Mechanism, Matter is what emerge from a > statistics on all relative computations. > > > > >> - pt >> > > > I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling? > > When you get down to the bottom of it, *numbers are spiritual entities*. > > > I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, > indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then > consciousness mind, etc. > > > > Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities. > > > > Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and > math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems > to me. > > I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I > reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual > entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively > material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through > this. > > Bruno > > >
A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist). M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language group) created by material entities. But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A (A→M), is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is enough? In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever materialists are misguided). - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
