On 12/12/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift <[email protected]
<javascript:>> wrote:
On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift
<[email protected]> wrote:
Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise".
(Derrida, Rorty, …)
That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism.
Confirmation does not make an idea true, but it is better
than nothing, once we postulate some reality.
Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like
some “religions” do, although only when they are used for
that purpose. Some philosophies vindicate their lack of
rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, and
obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea,
but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
Bruno
Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the
(youtube) lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
I've been following him like forever.
* e.g.
* *Mathematics is /so/ useful because physical scientists and
engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the
"religious" fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and
their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases is
misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms"
that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the
so-called infinity.*
Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even
without the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”.
Induction axioms, infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the
phenomenology. The phenomenology is not less real, but its is not
primary, it is second order, and that fiction is needed to
survive, even if fictionally.
Bruno
To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p)
correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non
provable. The machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor
even anything describable in any 3p terms.
To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is
intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make
consciousness primary.
Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a
digital body.
But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital
body in his childhood, to survive some disease?
You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point
will be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can
be shown that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish,
without observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely
many emulation of approximations of that physical reality at some
level of substitution (fine grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for
example). Then, infinitely many such approximation exists in
arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, and the
invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution”
(definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to
get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a
continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p &
p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of
provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine,
shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p
-> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA
is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of
the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss,
then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss.
But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. Nothing which is proven
can be false, which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.
Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very
different from the common one.
Brent
Put in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove
that the provability of something entails that something. PA is
maximally modest on her own provability ability.
In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the
~[]f, equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in
general not provable and is not a theorem of PA.
Incompleteness enforces the nuances between
Truthp
Provable[]p
Knowable[]p & p
Observable[]p & <>t. (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ =
consistent)
Sensible[]p & <>t
And incompleteness also doubles, or split, the provable, the
observable and the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*.
That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5
“terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes
on the Self, with two of them (Truth and Knowable) at the intersection
of Earth (effective, provable) and Heaven (truth).
The beauty is that G* proves p <-> []p <-> []p&p <-> []p&<>t <->
[]p&<>t&p, but G proves virtually none. (p sigma_1). In this setting p
-> []p is equivalent with sigma_1 completeness, or Turing
universality, and the Löbian entities typically can prove all p -> []p
formula. But the consistent machine cannot prove []p -> p in general.
That is why the logic and the mathematics of all the nuances differ a
lot from the machine's local point of view, despite they true equivalence.
Bruno
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
- pt
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