> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:44 AM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com > <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > Pure numbers may not correspond to point in time and space, but their > > relationships do. > > Where and when did 2+2=4 happen?
That is a category mistake. Events happens, in physical realities. “2+2=4” can be said to be true, not that it happens. The truth of 2+2=4 is just not a physical truth. It is an arithmetical truth. > Does that relationship between 2 and 4 ever change? Same remark. We can’t say that it changes, nor that it does not change, as change does not apply. > > > Doesn't the fact that "John Clark is conscious of every point of time in > > his life, > > But I haven't been conscious of every point of time in my life, only about > 2/3 of the time. > > > and none of those John Clark view points ceases to exist", already > > contradict your idea of change? > > Every point along the time axis of my world-line corresponds to a DIFFERENT > arrangement of matter in space. Things change and I live. How could that be false in any computation, notably those approximating your brain in arithmetic? Unless you are not Turing emulable, that occurs an infinitely many often in arithmetic. If something physical needs to be added, how could a universal machine detect it, and how would that physical primary thing interfere with the computations in arithmetic up to make the all disappear? To invoke a physical universe in the mechanist setting is like to invoke a wave packet reduction in quantum mechanics. It is like adding something nobody has evidence for, just to not test a theory. It is bad philosophy/religion. > > > "Computer Science is no more about computers than astronomy is about > > telescopes." > > Bad analogy. The Andromeda Galaxy would exist without telescopes but > computations would not exist without computers or brains made of something > that can change. If you agree that 2+2=4 independently of you, then it follows that all computations exists independently of you. That has been discovered by Post and Gödel, but made precise by Church and Turing (through their proof of the equivalence of the formalism involved). Today we know that not only all computations are emulated in arithmetic, but we know that they are already emulated by just one degree 4 diophantine polynomial. > > > People are convicted without there being any eye witnesses or direct > > evidence all the time. > > Memory can be very unreliable so I don't give much credibility to eyewitness > testimony even if they're honest, I think circumstantial evidence and the > deductions that come from it are far more compelling . > > > In those cases it requires indirect evidence > > Indirect evidence is still evidence, invisible evidence is not. You claim to > have a invisible photo of my fingerprints on the murder weapon, but that's > not good enough to send me to jail, not even in Trump's America, at least not > yet. > > >> it's easy to understand why we can't see beyond the Hubble volume, but > >> it's very hard to understand why we can't detect non-material Turing > >> machines if they exist, > > > Why is that hard to understand? > > I can't explain why we can't detect non-material Turing machines if they > exist and are a vital part of reality and I'm pretty sure you can't either > because if you could you'd have done so by now. The problem is that you don’t study the proofs given. > > >> and if they are responsible for our consciousness it's even harder to > >> understand why a change in the matter in our brain changes our > >> consciousness and a change in our consciousness changes the matter in our > >> brain. > > > This is explained well in Markus Muller's paper: > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf> > > Muller wasn't even trying to explain that, the paper isn't talking about what > we're discussing, he specifically says "The question of consciousness is > irrelevant for this paper”. Yes, he does not take the whole first person indeterminacy into account. Its probability is still 3p, and its use of Kolmogorov is appealing, but not quite justified. > Muller also says in the paper "objective reality is not assumed on this > approach" and that's fine but he certainly isn't the first to question > realism, Bell told us more that 50 years ago that things can't be local and > realistic. But we were talking about subjective reality. > > > Among the predictions he reached assuming only the existence of > > computations:The Big Bang: > Abby will identify a singular state in the past, where the universe was > particularly “small” and “simple” in the algorithmic sense. > > As I said as far as consciousness is concerned it doesn't matter if the > argument is sound or not, but as long as we're on the subject, It would seem > to me it would be even simpler if the previous state of the universe was > more or less the same as it is today, if Fred Hoyle's Steady State Cosmology > had turned out to be correct I have no doubt somebody would be using > virtually identical arguments to say that Solomonoff induction had predicted > the Steady State. After all an algorithm that does not need to change > anything doesn't need to be very long. I'd be a lot more impressed if he > predicted something we didn't already know, something testable and not > obvious. > > Another problem is it's not entirely clear what he means by simple, is the > Mandelbrot Set simple? In one way its infinitely complex and yet it can be > generated with just a few lines of code. You mentioned Kolmogorov complexity, > it says the complexity of a mathematical object is the size of the smallest > algorithm that can produce it, but the problem is in general there is no way > to compute the exact size of that smallest algorithm, you can't even compute > a lower bound for it. > > > Addressing your point with changing matter of the brain being correlated > to changing experience > > But that's not all, changing experience also corresponds with changing matter > in the brain. Human changing experience, locally, but not experience in general. You need only the relevant arithmetical, or combinatorical relations. Or you beg the question in the same recurrent manner of the creationists, and people having dogma. > logically if X then Y is true and Y then X is also true then X=Y. > > > In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this > > “physical universe”; > > I don't know what torturous logic you used to reach that conclusion. > > > it is merely a useful tool to predict her future observations. > > And that useful tool predicts she will have no future observations.whatsoever > if a bullet is blasted into the physical matter in her brain. > > > Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, > > And that is what's important if we're still talking about subjectivity. > > > If the measure µ that is computed within her computational universe > > A computational universe needs to be able to compute, If Mechanism is correct, the universe cannot be computable. If Mechanism is false, the universe cannot be computable. With and without mechanism, the universe cannot be computable. Of course to get this you need to asses step 3 ... > and computations need for something to change, and pure numbers can't change > but matter/energy can. But arithmetical relations can mimic all computations, and thus all computable RELATIVE change, like the block universe of GR. You beg the question by assuming all the time a primary physical universe. Just study the reasoning, and you will understand that this idea does not work, unless you abandon digital mechanism. Bruno > > > Appearance of Physical Laws > Observation 8.4 (Principle of persistent regularities). Computable > regularities that were holding in the past tend to persist in the future. > > There is no way to observe persistent regularities without memories and > memories can't happen unless the past changed something that persisted into > the present, and there is no way to compute anything about regularities > unless the computer or brain has something in it that can change. If it's not > matter/energy then what is that something? I haven't heard anybody give even > the hint of an answer to that. > > > He gets all of these results from straight computer science, considering > > what observers would see if indeed, all computations exist > > Don't you think it's odd he "predicted" things we already knew and not one > thing we didn't? I think it's odd. And I still don't understand what is doing > all the computing in this non-physical computational universe of his. > > > I don't think the evidence above is invisible. We're talking about > > predictions of theories, not of the theories themselves (which of course > > are invisible). You can't point to a "law of physics" any more than I can > > point to you a non-material computation > > I can point to physical law doing something in fact doing everything, but > non-material computation does nothing and you can't point to nothing. > > > There is plenty of counter evidence. Particles can do computations but > > computations can't do particles. > > > You said particles can be simulated in a previous e-mail. > > Nothing can be simulated without a computer and a computer won't work unless > there is something in it that can change. And no computation can tell you > exactly what a particle's position in space and velocity through space is. > And no computation can tell you exactly how much energy a particle has in an > instant in time. Particles don't need computations but computations need > particles because particles can change but numbers can't. > > >> A change in the matter in our brain changes our consciousness and a > >> change in our consciousness changes the matter in our brain. And our > >> consciousness can't change numbers and numbers can't change our > >> consciousness. > > > Replace "numbers" with "computations" and your sentence doesn't hold. > > Yes it does, our consciousness can't change computations without changing > matter and computations can't change consciousness without changing matter, > and that's why invisible computations are such a bore. > > > You keep injecting the word numbers. It is the truth concerning relations > > between numbers provides the platform for computations > > The truth or falsehood of these numerical relationships 2+3=5 and 4+6 =7 > never changes and therefore are incapable of being the working ingredient of > a computer or a brain. > > > just as it is the relations between electrons in a transistor that enable > > the computations, > > But particles are different from numbers, the relationship between electrons > in a transistor can change. > > >>> But didn't you accept the block universe view? > > >> Yes I think it's true to a first approximation, but it ignores Quantum > >> Mechanics. > > > You get the block universe view with just special relativity, which is QM > > friendly. > > Even Einstein knew special relativity gives a very incomplete description of > reality because it says nothing about gravity or even acceleration, that's > why he worked for 10 years and came up with general relativity; but even that > is incomplete because it says nothing about quantum mechanics. > > >Yes, the mind needs to change (from its internal point of view). > > I'm glad we at least agree on that. > > > But would you agree that the mind's substrate does not need to change? > > I.e., the mind could exist within what is objectively an unchanging object. > > NO, I would most certainly NOT agree!! > > > I thought you subscribed to the computational theory of mind. > > I do. A mind just needs computations and computations just needs for > something to change. > > > What you use to build a mind is irrelevant, > > It would be impractical but you could build a intelligent conscious mind out > of Legos or beer cans but one thing is NOT irrelevant, whatever you use it > must have the ability to change, and numbers don't have that ability and > neither does numerical relationships. > > > An invisible game that can't DO anything isn't much of a game, it's not > > much of anything. > > > Unless you happen to live in that game. > > You can't live in the game unless the pattern of electrical charges inside > the computer running the Life game is changing. > > >>> Different universes don't causally interact. However we can simulate > >>> other them to access information about them. This is what we do when we > >>> run our material computers in this universe > > >> And we can also use our our material computers in this universe to > >> simulate Harry Potter's school at Hogwarts, and that is exactly what they > >> did in the movies. > > > Your point? > > Guess. > > >>> Where are all of the trillions of yottabytes of the first 10^36 digits of > >>> Pi stored? > > >>If, as seems likely, space and time are not infinitely divisible and the > >>entire universe lacks the computational resources to calculate the first > >>10^36 digits of PI then it would be meaningless to say PI has 10^36 digits. > >>In fact if space is not continuous then a circle does not exist if we use > >>the standard definition of a circle. > > > You are elevating physical material to the supreme explanation of > > everything, > > Yes, but of course we don't yet have an explanation of everything about > physical material and we may never have it. > > > Kids in school are taught the digits of Pi go on forever. > > I know it's shocking but it's conceivable my sixth grade math teacher might > have been wrong. > > But in your view they only go on so long as we can bother to build a computer > to compute them. > > The amount of information that can be contained in a sphere depends on its > surface area not its volume, Seth Lloyd has figured that the total amount > ofinformation the the observable universe could contain if it were dense > enough to form a Black Hole would be 10^124 bits but it isn't that dense so > it would probably be closer to 10^90 bits; so if it's expressed in binary > notation I don't see how PI could have a 10^91 bit and certainly not a > 10^125'th bit. > > > What does this say about other universes out there > > Their calculations can't help us and our calculations can't help them find > the 10^125th bit. > > > See the predictions above to see how rich and useful of an idea this is as > a TOE. I don't know any TOE which has been more successful at producing > results, explaining why "quantum" etc., while assuming so little. > > Even Muller says "This work is not intended to be a “theory of everything”. > > >> And before you ask me in return the same question I will tell you: if you > >> became CEO of The Mystical Invisible Non-material Turing Machine > >> Corporation and a week later you became the richest most powerful man in > >> the history of the world I would say "yeah you got me, my idea is refuted". > > > That's unreasonable. > > Of course it's unreasonable, but you're the one making the unreasonable claim > that mystical invisible non-material calculations are important not me. > > >> Eternal inflation has observable consequences, > > > So does the theory that all computations exist. > > Certainly none we didn't already know, and think you can get invisible Turing > Machines to predict anything, provided you already know the answer. > > > If all computations exist, our universe should be ruled by simple laws > > Even if all correct computations exist in some sort of invisible platonic > heaven all incorrect computations exist there too, and none of them can do > anybody or anything any good until the correct computations are separated > from the incorrect computations, and for that you need matter because matter > can change and make visible calculations. > > > You didn't answer the question. Can a non-quamtum computer in a branch > > that diverged from ours a few minutes ago DO anything or can't it? > > Yes it can DO something provided there is something in that branch that can > change, and that means matter/energy. > > > Can you become CEO of the largest computing company in the world by > > harnessing the computers in all the decohered branches of the many worlds? > > Maybe, if I knew how to make a quantum computer because that's sorta how they > work, or at least that's one way to think about what they do and it's the way > I prefer but you could think about it the Copenhagen way if you like. By the > way, I wouldn't have to harness all the branches in the universe to rule the > world, a few million would be enough, maybe a few thousand depending on how > much overhead I have to use up for error correction. > > John K Clark > > > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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