> On 17 Dec 2018, at 18:36, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 1:47:29 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Dec 2018, at 21:14, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 2:11:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote: >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 8:06 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 1:41:08 AM UTC, Jason wrote: >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote: >> >> >> On Saturday, December 15, 2018, <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> >>>> wrote: >>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable. But >>>> you ignore that what is false is also provable. Provable is only relative >>>> to axioms. >>>> >>>> >>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not? >>>> >>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove >>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not? >>>> >>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs, >>>> and axioms? >>> >>> What do you think it tells us. Does it tell us that a false axiom will not >>> allow proof of a false proposition? >>> >>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from axioms. >>> Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them if they >>> lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they predict a >>> Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject that axiom as >>> an incorrect theory of mathematical truth. Similarly, we might find axioms >>> that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set of axioms, thereby >>> building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way of doing this. In >>> that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and error, comparing >>> our theories with our observations, etc. >> >> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", meaning that >> it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine. Remember a >> Turing machine isn't a real device. >> >> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of reality; >> how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and space and >> time)? AG >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> >> The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary. >> >> If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime >> illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime. >> So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence, >> they're imaginary. QED. AG >> >> >> Imaginary mean exists only in imagination. >> >> Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation run >> on a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that computer >> and alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be located in >> spacetime. But clearly this computer and alien civilization does not exist >> only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads with which to >> imagine them. >> >> If you insist on asserting something, anything, exists, but not in >> spacetime, you have a huge burden of proof since it's impossible to prove >> your assertion by any empirical test. So, you're not dealing with a >> scientific hypothesis, since it can't be falsified. AG >> >> >> It can be falsified. I think you missed the posts I wrote in response to >> John. The basic idea is this: >> >> Theories predict certain observations. We can check for those observations. >> If we find them, the theory has passed a test. If we don't find them we >> keep looking. If we find observations that contradict the predictions of the >> theory, then we reject that theory and look for something better. >> >> As I previously wrote, I could offer some information about the predictions >> of modern physics; not only what they are, and how they're tested, but how >> they came about. I wouldn't have refer to some paper. I haven't seen any >> plausibility arguments concerning predictions of arithmetic being the cause >> of the alleged illusion of matter and spacetime. Not one such argument as >> far as I can recall. None of the advocates of this theory are able to offer >> any motivational predictions and their plausibility BASED on your Platonic >> arithmetic theory; not one! AG > > You miss at least one, and show you don’t study the papers already referred > too. > > But the point is that there is no matter of choice if we postulate mechanism, > which refutes materialism, and the refutation is constructive, allowing to > test Mechanism by the observation of nature. Mechanism is the winner, up to > now. > > Bruno > > You ought to read again what I wrote above. Why is it that I can offer some > non-trivial explanations of the results of modern physics without demanding > that the reader study some papers? Why can't you do the same for some of the > major claims of your paper, for motivational purposes? AG
Because I work on this. The paper already written are relevant to the issue we are discussing. The UDA is already an attempt to make clear to non mathematician. But just tell me if you want a thread on the UDA. I have already explained it in all details more than three times on this list. I refer to the paper for not bothering the others. It is relevant, as it shown that materialism simply do not work, even just in physics, when we assume mechanism. We can do UDA step by step if you want, but at step 7, you will need to study a bit of mathematical logic. We can also begin with this. Bruno >> >> Jason >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
