On Sunday, December 16, 2018, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 7:41:08 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are >>>>>>>> provable. But you ignore that what is false is also provable. >>>>>>>> Provable is >>>>>>>> only relative to axioms. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove >>>>>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, >>>>>>> proofs, and axioms? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What do you think it tells us. Does it tell us that a false axiom >>>>>>> will not allow proof of a false proposition? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from >>>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute >>>>>> them >>>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they >>>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject >>>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth. Similarly, we >>>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set >>>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical >>>>>> way >>>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial >>>>>> and >>>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", >>>>>> meaning that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine. >>>>>> Remember a Turing machine isn't a real device. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of >>>>> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and >>>>> space and time)? AG >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Brent >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> >>>> >>>> The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary. >>>> >>> >>> *If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime >>> illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime. >>> So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence, >>> they're imaginary. QED. AG * >>> >>>> >>>> >> Imaginary mean exists only in imagination. >> >> Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation >> run on a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that >> computer and alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be >> located in spacetime. But clearly this computer and alien civilization >> does not exist only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads >> with which to imagine them. >> >> Jason >> > > > > > > The simulation hypothesis as you have stated it is an argument for > materialism. > > A simulation on one of our (conventional) computers is a bunch of > particles moving through CPU and GPU processors and LED pixels. One running > on some future quantum computer would be using qubit chips. > > What is the computer the advanced alien civilization is running "us" on? > It could be in fact "our" universe as quantum computer [ > https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.4455 ]! Then we would be a bunch of particles > running on the advanced alien civilization 's quantum computer, just as > simulations above ore particles running on one of our quantum computers. > > - pt > > > > You are right, the simulation hypothesis, as generally stated, doesn't escape materialism. My example was only to show there can be non-imaginary things that can't be located in spacetime. Jason > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
