On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:49 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >>> Most scientists would say quarks are real, because they are part of >>> successful theories which have explanatory power. >>> >> >> That is the semantic part of scientific realism -- the entities in our >> most successful theories correspond to elements of reality. That is just to >> acknowledge that the ontology is theory dependent -- not mind independent. >> So quarks may or may not be real -- we will probably never know. >> > > So what is wrong with the theory that the integers are real? (arithmetic > is successful, after all) > Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of "real". Integers are invented by humans, even though there is intersubjective agreement about them. Why would I want to? Mathematics is useful for describing the results of >> our observations and experiments. It is a convenient language. Do you think >> that English sentences are part of a mind-independent reality? >> > > Because arithmetical realism explains more while assuming less. > The trouble with this is that it does no such thing. Arithmetical realism does not even explain consciousness, much less physics. Can mechanism explain the quale 'red'? ..... > I think they are an excellent starting point. It is much easier, > conceptually for me to accept 2+2=4 is true, has always been and always > will be true, and needs no reason to be true, > But that is a matter of definition, not of ontology. Truth in arithmetic does not imply existence. > rather than the alternative, which is to accept the physical universe as > we see it exists on its own, independently of anything else or any other > reason. For what reason would such a physical universe exist, why does it > have this form, was it caused by something else, is there more beyond it? > As I have said, science does not answer 'why' questions. It describes and predicts -- which is as good an understanding as you will ever get. > Arithmetical realism provides a simple, elegant answer to these questions, > and moreover answers many more questions than assuming the physical > universe at the start. > No, it does not. Arithmetical realism does not actually answer any questions. It cannot explain consciousness any more than it can explain the existence of space and time, much less derive their properties. > Believing that there is something mind-independent to explain is better -- >> as long as one explores what this might mean, rather than assuming the >> answer from the start. >> > > We both assume something mind independent. You think it is the physical > universe, I think it is the integers. My assumption of the integers not > only explains why we have an objective field of mathematics, but with > Mechanism, it explains the emergence of the appearance of the physical > universe (without having to assume the physical universe). So I get to > explain two things with one assumption. > But mechanism has not done this. It is claimed that it can explain physics, but we have yet to see any evidence that it can explain anything. > Since you start with physicalism, and deny the objective existence of > arithmetical truth, you are confronted with the problem of explaining where > arithmetical truth comes from. You say it comes from axioms but since Godel > this has been known to be false. Your assumption can explain the physical > universe, but not the objective nature of arithmetical truth. > Incompleteness is not an objection to my contention that arithmetical truth is a deduction from the axioms. If some alternative notion of 'truth' calls some proposition that is not a theorem 'true', then you simply expand you axiom base. Nothing particularly profound here. The same is true of physical theories -- if they do not explain something that is observed (viz. 'true'), we change the theory. Further, I don't see any hope for how you can ever hope to explain why the > physical universe has the laws that it does. > Maybe that is just geography. In some theories, other universes have different laws. So why bother to explain why we see these laws and not others? They are just a feature of the local landscape -- geography. Why is it quantum mechanical, why are the laws so simple compared to the > total information state of the universe, > We can explain that by observing that we propose laws that are as simple as possible, consistent with the data. The laws are simple because we make them that way! > do altogether other universes exist? There is hope of getting answers to > these questions starting from the assumption of the integers, but there is > not if your starting assumption is the physical universe itself. > There is no evidence that any of these questions can be answered by starting from arithmetical realism. Besides, one does not ask why the orbit of the earth is what it is -- it is just geography, with no fundamental significance. If one goes to anthropic explanations, one achieves little -- it is a trivial truism that the universe we observe is one that is compatible with our existence. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRQBVf7aMZWg0D1rBRjm%2B0netDivJO0Zrp5RQFMcyzseQ%40mail.gmail.com.
