> On 15 May 2019, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:49 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Most scientists would say quarks are real, because they are part of > successful theories which have explanatory power. > > That is the semantic part of scientific realism -- the entities in our most > successful theories correspond to elements of reality. That is just to > acknowledge that the ontology is theory dependent -- not mind independent. So > quarks may or may not be real -- we will probably never know. > > So what is wrong with the theory that the integers are real? (arithmetic is > successful, after all) > > Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of "real". > Integers are invented by humans, even though there is intersubjective > agreement about them.
Who invented the humans? It is easier to explain the humans from the numbers than the contrary. > > > Why would I want to? Mathematics is useful for describing the results of our > observations and experiments. It is a convenient language. Do you think that > English sentences are part of a mind-independent reality? > > Because arithmetical realism explains more while assuming less. > > The trouble with this is that it does no such thing. Arithmetical realism > does not even explain consciousness, much less physics. Can mechanism explain > the quale 'red’? Yes, But you need to understand the difference between p, []p, []p & p, etc. > > ..... > > I think they are an excellent starting point. It is much easier, > conceptually for me to accept 2+2=4 is true, has always been and always will > be true, and needs no reason to be true, > > But that is a matter of definition, not of ontology. Truth in arithmetic does > not imply existence. It implies the existence of the solutions of a universal Diophantine equation, which explains the physical and the qualia when we assume mechanism. > > rather than the alternative, which is to accept the physical universe as we > see it exists on its own, independently of anything else or any other reason. > For what reason would such a physical universe exist, why does it have this > form, was it caused by something else, is there more beyond it? > > As I have said, science does not answer 'why' questions. It describes and > predicts -- which is as good an understanding as you will ever get. That looks like post roman christian propaganda. Don’t search why. Shut up and calculate. This is a lasting prejudices of the Aristotelian (weakly materialist) era. > > Arithmetical realism provides a simple, elegant answer to these questions, > and moreover answers many more questions than assuming the physical universe > at the start. > > No, it does not. Arithmetical realism does not actually answer any questions. > It cannot explain consciousness any more than it can explain the existence of > space and time, much less derive their properties. Proof? It looks you have read the posts nor the papers mentioned there. Read them ans ask specific question, if interested. Bruno > > Believing that there is something mind-independent to explain is better -- as > long as one explores what this might mean, rather than assuming the answer > from the start. > > We both assume something mind independent. You think it is the physical > universe, I think it is the integers. My assumption of the integers not only > explains why we have an objective field of mathematics, but with Mechanism, > it explains the emergence of the appearance of the physical universe (without > having to assume the physical universe). So I get to explain two things with > one assumption. > > But mechanism has not done this. It is claimed that it can explain physics, > but we have yet to see any evidence that it can explain anything. > > Since you start with physicalism, and deny the objective existence of > arithmetical truth, you are confronted with the problem of explaining where > arithmetical truth comes from. You say it comes from axioms but since Godel > this has been known to be false. Your assumption can explain the physical > universe, but not the objective nature of arithmetical truth. > > Incompleteness is not an objection to my contention that arithmetical truth > is a deduction from the axioms. If some alternative notion of 'truth' calls > some proposition that is not a theorem 'true', then you simply expand you > axiom base. Nothing particularly profound here. The same is true of physical > theories -- if they do not explain something that is observed (viz. 'true'), > we change the theory. > > Further, I don't see any hope for how you can ever hope to explain why the > physical universe has the laws that it does. > > Maybe that is just geography. In some theories, other universes have > different laws. So why bother to explain why we see these laws and not > others? They are just a feature of the local landscape -- geography. > > Why is it quantum mechanical, why are the laws so simple compared to the > total information state of the universe, > > We can explain that by observing that we propose laws that are as simple as > possible, consistent with the data. The laws are simple because we make them > that way! > > do altogether other universes exist? There is hope of getting answers to > these questions starting from the assumption of the integers, but there is > not if your starting assumption is the physical universe itself. > > There is no evidence that any of these questions can be answered by starting > from arithmetical realism. Besides, one does not ask why the orbit of the > earth is what it is -- it is just geography, with no fundamental > significance. If one goes to anthropic explanations, one achieves little -- > it is a trivial truism that the universe we observe is one that is compatible > with our existence. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRQBVf7aMZWg0D1rBRjm%2B0netDivJO0Zrp5RQFMcyzseQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRQBVf7aMZWg0D1rBRjm%2B0netDivJO0Zrp5RQFMcyzseQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9ABAA155-A1B9-48F2-A88A-52B0854E7675%40ulb.ac.be.
