> On 13 May 2019, at 08:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 3:49 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 11:20 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > From: Jason Resch <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: >> all computations are realised in all models of arithmetic. >> >> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism >> is manifestly a pipe dream. >> >> >> You sound certain. What is your evidence? >> >> Jason >> >> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, >> >> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were none, what >> evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is false? >> (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, among >> mathematicians, > On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most > mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional > mathematician!) > > > That's an anecdote, not data. > > The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads. > > It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some > justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory in > a field. > > No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this view > has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a progressive > theory. > > That is false. Taking the pre-existence of all conscious states (a natural > consequences of Platonism) is the only theory in science I am aware of that > plausibly explains why our universe has: > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf> > I have started to read this paper. It seems to be just another take on > computationalist arguments such as given by Bruno. It could be criticised in > detail, but the main problem I see is the rejection of scientific realism at > the start, and the unquestioned assumption of mathematical realism. Defining > 'things' by relationships loses the distinction between physics and > mathematics, which is the cause of all the trouble. > > Simple physical laws that are probabilistic > Persistent regularities > An external world that contains the observer > Inter-subjective agreement on physical laws > These are just empirical observations. We choose laws that are as simple as > possible to describe observations. There is nothing profound in that. > > Simple initial conditions > Who said the initial conditions of the universe were simple? > Observation of a universe that evolves in time > What is time in General relativity. It is merely a local phenomenon. > Observation of a universe with an absolute beginning in time > Does it? There are plenty of cosmological theories where this is not the > case. > https://arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0001020.pdf > <https://arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0001020.pdf> > Why Occam's razor works > Why the postulates of QM hold > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf > <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf> > Why physics is quantum mechanical > Bruno has not proved this.
Yes I did. > The real question is why do we observe a classical world? > Why certain qualia are incommunicable > All quail are incommunicable by definition. Not something that requires > explanation. So you agree that there are incommunicable truth. Nice. But that phenomenon *is* explained with mechanism. > > Why do you consider it a failure? Where does Nominalism succeed where > Platonism fails? > > Scientific realism rejects platonism. Since the closure of Plato Academy. To be sure, I translate “platonism” by “mathematical realism”. But scientific realism does not reject arithmetical realism, which is much weaker than the fuzzy mathematical realism (on which I am myself rather skeptical). Bruno > And scientific realism is where the progress has been made. And that is > nominalism wrt mathematics. > > I await your reason, argument, or evidence. > > Arithmetical realism is part of platonism, if not the whole of it. And > arithmetical realism is manifestly false -- numbers are not things. > > What is a thing anyway? > > Maybe the relationships are all that exist. Maybe the world is made of math. > At first that sounded nuts, but when I thought about it I hard to wonder, > what exactly is the other option? That the world is made of "things"? What > the hell is a "things"? It was one of those concepts that fold under the > slightest interrogation. Look closely at any object and you find it's an > amalgamation of particles. But look closely at the particles and you find > that they are irreducible representations of the Poincaré symmetry > group--whatever that meant. The point is, particles, at bottom, look a lot > like math. -- Amanda Gefter > > So what? > > What separates the existent from the non-existent? > > It might be that at a certain level of description it becomes impossible to > adequately represent the world other than mathematically. ... > So yeah, you might think, if we eventually did have a one-to-one mapping, > what could be the grounds for denying that reality was mathematical? I'm not > really sure. I suppose I'm very skeptical of anything in philosophy that > purports to explain the difference between abstract maths and maths that's > substantiated. Because in the end, what could possibly explain that > difference in terms of? Like, I reject the question 'What breathes fire into > the equations?' Because anything you say is just gonna be figurative, right? > Because you'd say, 'Well, there's the abstract maths and then the actual > universe is a sort of substructure of all the possible structure there could > be. So what's the difference between the uninstantiated structure and the > instantiated structure?' Well, the philosopher will say there's a primitive > instantiation relation or something--you could invent some metaphysical > language to talk about it, but to me that's no different from saying that > some of the maths has pixie dust in it. It's not going to do any work. > Because what could it possibly connect to that would have any meaning? If > you ask questions in science like 'What causes an earthquake?' you appeal to > conceptual resources and those are non-empty because they're tied to > observation. But maths--pure maths isn't tied to observation. If the theory > of everything id a mathematical theory, how would you test it? It would have > to have some content that has to do with something other than mathematics. -- > James Ladyman, when asked "Does that mean the physical world is made of math?" > > That sounds confused. But if anything, Ladyman is arguing for scientific > realism > > > >> what is your alternative?) > Nominalism. > > > Incompleteness disproves nominalism. Arithmetical truth was proven not only > to be not human defined, but to be not human definable. > > What has arithmetical truth got to do with it? > > The independence of arithmetical truth is Platonism. With it you get all the > consequences of that infinite truth: > The truth that 9 is composite implies the existence of its factor 3. > The truth of the Nth state of the machine during the execution of a Kth > program implies the existence of the execution trace of program K, etc. > > You are making the usual mistake of taking the existential quantifier over a > domain as an ontological statement. > > Why should one's ontological opinions take precedence over what our best > theories tell us? > > Our best theories are based on scientific realism, not mathematical realism. > > You have still not addressed that nominalism is disproved by incompleteness. > > You have not shown that it is. > > > Numbers are just names, not existing things. > > Again, where is your evidence? I gave you mine in support of Platonism. > > You gave no viable evidence for platonism. > > See above. When simple theories explain many facts, that's generally taken as > evidence in support of the theory. > > > If you have no evidence contrary to Platonism you should at least remain > undecided/agnostic/humble on the matter. > > Why? Platonism rests on a confusion. I reject that confusion, and hence > platonism. > > What is the confusion? > > Existential quantifiers confused with ontology. > > What replaces it at the simplest level is nominalism -- numbers are names, > not things. > > > Let's define what is meant by "thing" first. Then we can debate whether or > not numbers meet that definition, and whether or not it is important to the > question of whether numbers and their relations could explain the appearance > of reality. > > But before that, let's address this question: Do you believe it is possible > (in principle) that the physical universe could be explained from something > more primitive? > > No. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRA9jhLSsgzqF_Ftp3phNuYOPa4n_kKuaD6ACej5Z5LMw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRA9jhLSsgzqF_Ftp3phNuYOPa4n_kKuaD6ACej5Z5LMw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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