On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 6:00 PM Russell Standish <[email protected]>
wrote:

> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 05:11:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:45 PM Russell Standish <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >
> >     >
> >     > That remains to be proved. Church-Turing is about calculable
> numbers, not  about
> >     > reification. It also works in a purely nominalist account.
> >     >
> >
> >     Hmm - possibly I went too fast here. The existence of a running
> >     universal dovetailer is sufficient for the whole numbers to be
> >     reified, as the abovementioned constructive program will eventually
> be
> >     run for all such whole numbers.
> >
> >
> > For the dovetailer to run on all numbers, it must be run "in
> arithmetic", as
> > Bruno claims. If you do not assume arithmetical realism, the dovetailer
> cannot
> > get off the ground unless it is implemented in a physical computer. But
> that is
> > always necessarily finite, so the argument again collapses.
> >
> >
> >     In order for the dovetailer to fail to
> >     generate all whole numbers, it must be starved of some resources,
> >     which is an ultrafinitist move.
> >
> >
> > Or the necessary involvement of a finite physical computer....
> >
>
> That is an assumption. There are proposed cosmologies that allow for
> an infinite number of computational steps to occur - IIRC, the "big
> rip" is one such.


I don't think so -- the "big rip" would simple tear the physical computer
to pieces.....


> Once multiverses get into the picture, there is
> almost assuredly sufficient computational resources to go around.
>

No so fast. The multiverse is an assemblage of disjoint universes -- what
happens in one universe does not affect any other universe. So that doesn't
get you any more computing power.


> Nevertheless, it is an interesting question as to whether insufficient
> resources to support the full reality of the integers makes any damn
> difference at all to mathematics or even observable reality. Norm
> Wildberger is one of the few people championing this sort of work.
>

If the dovetailer has only limited resources, does it actually get you
anything at all?


> >
> >     I think that the CT thesis requires that all possible programs can be
> >     run in order for a machine to be considered truly
> >     universal.
> >
> >
> > That might be the case, in which case the argument works only on the
> realist
> > assumption. Since there is no necessity to make such an assumption, we
> can
> > safely ignore the whole shebang....
> >
>
> There's a lot of plausible arguments in favour of a multiversal
> reality - indeed it tends to be the prevalent background assumption of
> this mailing list.
>

This list is a very small sample of the scientific community, much less of
humanity as a whole. Multiverse ideas are around, but unless seriously
constrained, they are definitely suspect.


> My gut feeling is that if there really is an ultrafinitist limit to
> the amount of computation available in the universe, then there ought
> to be some measureable consequence of this in our observable universe.
>

Why? That might be the case if the computationalist/arithmetical realist
thesis has some basis. But there is no evidence for that. Physicalism is
still safer bet......

Bruce

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