On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 09:05:27PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
>     That is an assumption. There are proposed cosmologies that allow for
>     an infinite number of computational steps to occur - IIRC, the "big
>     rip" is one such.
> 
> 
> I don't think so -- the "big rip" would simple tear the physical computer to
> pieces.....

Yes, but give it enough energy to execute an inifnite number of
computational steps before its demise. Or so I was told :).

There are cosmologies where that doesn't happen too - the "big crunch"
being one IIRC. That was famously where Tipler came unstuck.

>  
> 
>     Once multiverses get into the picture, there is
>     almost assuredly sufficient computational resources to go around.
> 
> 
> No so fast. The multiverse is an assemblage of disjoint universes -- what
> happens in one universe does not affect any other universe. So that doesn't 
> get
> you any more computing power.
>  
>

I don't need to execute all programs here, they just need to be
executed somewhere. So the Multiverse definitely does fit the bill, so
long as there's enough of them. The string landscape probably doesn't
have enough :)

>     Nevertheless, it is an interesting question as to whether insufficient
>     resources to support the full reality of the integers makes any damn
>     difference at all to mathematics or even observable reality. Norm
>     Wildberger is one of the few people championing this sort of work.
> 
> 
> If the dovetailer has only limited resources, does it actually get you 
> anything
> at all?
>  

Norm thinks so. But its early days in that program, and I don't think
they have many results. I just point it out that it is really the
logical conclusion from the position you're arguing.

> 
>     >
>     >     I think that the CT thesis requires that all possible programs can 
> be
>     >     run in order for a machine to be considered truly
>     >     universal.
>     >
>     >
>     > That might be the case, in which case the argument works only on the
>     realist
>     > assumption. Since there is no necessity to make such an assumption, we
>     can
>     > safely ignore the whole shebang....
>     >
> 
>     There's a lot of plausible arguments in favour of a multiversal
>     reality - indeed it tends to be the prevalent background assumption of
>     this mailing list.
> 
> 
> This list is a very small sample of the scientific community, much less of
> humanity as a whole.

Do you want it otherwise?

> Multiverse ideas are around, but unless seriously
> constrained, they are definitely suspect.
>  

Maybe so - but let's not try to give up critical thinking about them.

> 
>     My gut feeling is that if there really is an ultrafinitist limit to
>     the amount of computation available in the universe, then there ought
>     to be some measureable consequence of this in our observable universe.
> 
> 
> Why? That might be the case if the computationalist/arithmetical realist 
> thesis
> has some basis. But there is no evidence for that. Physicalism is still safer
> bet......
>

Everything theories have definite advantages over theories that say
"it just is - some things exist, others don't, for no apparent
reason". So its worth trying to pin down what constraints that
assumption puts on out observed reality. Of course, it may be that "it
just is" wins out at the end, but that would be like: OK science stops
here.

BTW - computationalism already has a "some things exist, others don't"
moment. The CT thesis implicitly assumes that hypercomputers do not
exist. If they did, then there would be some computations that are
impossible for a Turing machine to perform.


-- 

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Dr Russell Standish                    Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow        [email protected]
Economics, Kingston University         http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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