On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 5:58:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 20 Jun 2019, at 12:44, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 5:10:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Jun 2019, at 12:42, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, June 19, 2019 at 5:04:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 18 Jun 2019, at 15:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> In >>> >>> *Embodied and disembodied computing at the Turing Centenary:* >>> *Turing’s Titanic Machine?* >>> by S. Barry Cooper >>> >>> http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/pure/logic/computability/BarryTalks/titanic_CACM.pdf >>> >>> >>> *As Samson Abramsky puts it (private communication communication, 2011):* >>> *“Turing took traditional mathematical objects, real numbers, functions, >>> etc. as the things to be computed. In subsequent work in computer science, >>> the view of computation has broadened enormously. In the work on concurrent >>> processes, the behavior is the object of interest. There is indeed a lack >>> of a clear-cut Church-Turing thesis in this wider sphere of >>> computation—computation as interaction."* >>> >>> Add "(embodied) experience" to "interaction". >>> >>> So there is a *beyond-CT* suggested in all of this. >>> >>> >>> >>> With all my respect to Barry Cooper and Samson Abramski, what they show >>> is that there are other interesting notions, beyond computation. >>> >>> The provability notion is typically “beyond CT”, or beyond computation, >>> but they are Turing emulable, like all interaction-like notion of >>> computation are Turing emulable. >>> >>> And, yes, they are right, those notions does not admit a Church-Thesis. >>> It is just simpler to not call them computation. Those other notions does >>> not violate CT, and are often based on CT, more or less explicitly. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> Just as G.Strawson says "matter is a mystery”, >> >> >> That is a good insight. I did not wait Mechanism to be suspicious that >> the notion of matter is nonsensical. >> >> >> >> >> computation (what is it?) is a mystery, >> >> >> >> I don’t see why. On the contrary, it explains the explainable! >> >> >> >> >> except in the certitude of the *received doctrine* of Church-Turing >> Thesis. >> >> >> On the contrary. Everyone agreed on all example of intuitively computable >> functions, and it admits an intuitively simple and informal definition: a >> function is computable if we can explain, with a finite list of words, how >> to compute it on any input, in a finite time. >> It just happens that we cannot defined “finite”, and then there has been >> the discovery of the universal machine, and the empirical discovery that >> all attempts to define formally the computable functions has always led to >> the same class of functions. >> Some people,like me (and Gödel) took many years to accept the high >> plausibility of CT. >> >> Of course, also, there is no certainty here. There is no certainty in any >> science. And CT is not a doctrine, it is a theory, unrefuted until now. >> >> Now, many confuse the notion of computation with some of its intensional >> variants, to claim that CT is refuted or unwarranted, but that is just >> ignorance. >> >> >> >> >> >> But "there are other interesting notions, beyond computation" just leads >> to mysticism it seems, since *what are these "other interesting >> notions"?* What's an example of one these? >> >> >> Truth, provability, knowledge, observable, relativize computations, etc. >> >> >> >> >> I know that neither you nor Cosmin will accept there is such a thing as >> *experience >> processing *(with entities - *experiences/qualia irreducible to >> information/numbers* - because it is *unconventional computing*, >> something it seems you don't think exists (even though there is an annual >> conference of it). >> >> >> Yes, and I have been invited to submit a paper, which I did. I have no >> problem with this. Unconventional computing does not contradict CT, no more >> than quantum computing. But they address problems which are not under the >> topic of CT, and emphasise special aspect of some type of computation, but >> all machines does that with the different modes of self-reference. Keep in >> mind that the machine’s phenomenologies, can be proved to be NON >> computable. Of course this used CT. In fact the whole interest of CT is >> that it permits to define and study the non computable. Without CT, no >> mathematician would say that the 10th problem of Hilbert has been solved >> (negatively). (The problem of finding a method to solve Diophantine >> equation). >> >> Almost all attribute of “codes” are provably non computable. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > many confuse the notion of computation with some of its intensional > variants, to claim that CT is refuted or unwarranted, but that is just > ignorance > > Intensional semantics lies at the heart of (unconventional computing). > While extrinsic semantics > > -------------- > > - *Denotational semantics > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotational_semantics>*, whereby each > phrase in the language is interpreted as a *denotation > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotation_(semiotics)>*, i.e. a > conceptual meaning that can be thought of abstractly. Such denotations are > often mathematical objects inhabiting a mathematical space, but it is not > a > requirement that they should be so. As a practical necessity, denotations > are described using some form of mathematical notation, which can in turn > be formalized as a denotational metalanguage. For example, denotational > semantics of functional languages > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_programming_language> often > translate the language into domain theory > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_theory>. Denotational semantic > descriptions can also serve as compositional translations from a > programming language into the denotational metalanguage and used as a > basis > for designing compilers <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compiler>. > - > - *Operational semantics > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_semantics>*, whereby the > execution of the language is described directly (rather than by > translation). Operational semantics loosely corresponds to > interpretation <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpreter_(computing)>, > although again the "implementation language" of the interpreter is > generally a mathematical formalism. Operational semantics may define an > abstract > machine <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_machine> (such as the SECD > machine <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SECD_machine>), and give > meaning to phrases by describing the transitions they induce on states of > the machine. Alternatively, as with the pure lambda calculus > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus>, operational semantics > can be defined via syntactic transformations on phrases of the language > itself; > - > - *Axiomatic semantics > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiomatic_semantics>*, whereby one > gives meaning to phrases by describing the *axioms > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom>* that apply to them. Axiomatic > semantics makes no distinction between a phrase's meaning and the logical > formulas that describe it; its meaning *is* exactly what can be proven > about it in some logic. The canonical example of axiomatic semantics is > Hoare > logic <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoare_logic>. > > ————— > > > All semantics are good. Not sure what you mention this. This is > independent of CT. > > > > > may well be well-developed, both physical and experiential semantics of > new kinds of programs - e.g. produced by synbio - that actually go out and > live in the real world are not yet. > > But to call the UC researchers "ignorant" is just name-calling. > > > I said some paper are wrong when claiming that CT is refuted, and there > are ignorant people in all group of people. No need of idolatry on some > special group of people, especially when they advance thought provoking > ideas. > > Saying that some people are wrong is not insult, but a checkable fact. I > wrote a letter to one of them, and we eventually agreed that there has been > some tongue-slipping, on the matter. It is not a big deal. Penrose is also > wrong on CT and on Gödel. That happens, even to good or famous > mathematicians. > > Being wrong is not a problem. The problem is when people knows that they > are wrong, but continue the error, by fear of losing notoriety, or by > ideology, or god knows why. > > Bruno > > > > I would just say that
Nature (or the cosmos - including us and our consciousnesses - the whole shebang, everything) is a *natural* computer*. If it is anything else, it is *governed by magic.* That's the *Natural Computing Thesis* (not to pick any particular names linked to it) NCT is just as good as, or better than CTT. * or unconventional - http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2f0aac96-19d3-44d9-b4c2-71b439af0dcc%40googlegroups.com.
