> On 20 Jun 2019, at 15:41, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 5:58:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 20 Jun 2019, at 12:44, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 5:10:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 19 Jun 2019, at 12:42, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, June 19, 2019 at 5:04:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 18 Jun 2019, at 15:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> In >>>> >>>> Embodied and disembodied computing at the Turing Centenary: >>>> Turing’s Titanic Machine? >>>> by S. Barry Cooper >>>> http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/pure/logic/computability/BarryTalks/titanic_CACM.pdf >>>> >>>> <http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/pure/logic/computability/BarryTalks/titanic_CACM.pdf> >>>> >>>> >>>> As Samson Abramsky puts it (private communication communication, 2011): >>>> “Turing took traditional mathematical objects, real numbers, functions, >>>> etc. as the things to be computed. In subsequent work in computer science, >>>> the view of computation has broadened enormously. In the work on >>>> concurrent processes, the behavior is the object of interest. There is >>>> indeed a lack of a clear-cut Church-Turing thesis in this wider sphere of >>>> computation—computation as interaction." >>>> >>>> Add "(embodied) experience" to "interaction". >>>> >>>> So there is a beyond-CT suggested in all of this. >>> >>> >>> With all my respect to Barry Cooper and Samson Abramski, what they show is >>> that there are other interesting notions, beyond computation. >>> >>> The provability notion is typically “beyond CT”, or beyond computation, but >>> they are Turing emulable, like all interaction-like notion of computation >>> are Turing emulable. >>> >>> And, yes, they are right, those notions does not admit a Church-Thesis. It >>> is just simpler to not call them computation. Those other notions does not >>> violate CT, and are often based on CT, more or less explicitly. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Just as G.Strawson says "matter is a mystery”, >> >> That is a good insight. I did not wait Mechanism to be suspicious that the >> notion of matter is nonsensical. >> >> >> >> >>> computation (what is it?) is a mystery, >> >> >> I don’t see why. On the contrary, it explains the explainable! >> >> >> >> >>> except in the certitude of the received doctrine of Church-Turing Thesis. >> >> On the contrary. Everyone agreed on all example of intuitively computable >> functions, and it admits an intuitively simple and informal definition: a >> function is computable if we can explain, with a finite list of words, how >> to compute it on any input, in a finite time. >> It just happens that we cannot defined “finite”, and then there has been the >> discovery of the universal machine, and the empirical discovery that all >> attempts to define formally the computable functions has always led to the >> same class of functions. >> Some people,like me (and Gödel) took many years to accept the high >> plausibility of CT. >> >> Of course, also, there is no certainty here. There is no certainty in any >> science. And CT is not a doctrine, it is a theory, unrefuted until now. >> >> Now, many confuse the notion of computation with some of its intensional >> variants, to claim that CT is refuted or unwarranted, but that is just >> ignorance. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> But "there are other interesting notions, beyond computation" just leads to >>> mysticism it seems, since what are these "other interesting notions"? >>> What's an example of one these? >> >> Truth, provability, knowledge, observable, relativize computations, etc. >> >> >> >>> >>> I know that neither you nor Cosmin will accept there is such a thing as >>> experience processing (with entities - experiences/qualia irreducible to >>> information/numbers - because it is unconventional computing, something it >>> seems you don't think exists (even though there is an annual conference of >>> it). >> >> Yes, and I have been invited to submit a paper, which I did. I have no >> problem with this. Unconventional computing does not contradict CT, no more >> than quantum computing. But they address problems which are not under the >> topic of CT, and emphasise special aspect of some type of computation, but >> all machines does that with the different modes of self-reference. Keep in >> mind that the machine’s phenomenologies, can be proved to be NON computable. >> Of course this used CT. In fact the whole interest of CT is that it permits >> to define and study the non computable. Without CT, no mathematician would >> say that the 10th problem of Hilbert has been solved (negatively). (The >> problem of finding a method to solve Diophantine equation). >> >> Almost all attribute of “codes” are provably non computable. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> many confuse the notion of computation with some of its intensional >> variants, to claim that CT is refuted or unwarranted, but that is just >> ignorance >> >> Intensional semantics lies at the heart of (unconventional computing). While >> extrinsic semantics >> >> -------------- >> Denotational semantics >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotational_semantics>, whereby each phrase >> in the language is interpreted as a denotation >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotation_(semiotics)>, i.e. a conceptual >> meaning that can be thought of abstractly. Such denotations are often >> mathematical objects inhabiting a mathematical space, but it is not a >> requirement that they should be so. As a practical necessity, denotations >> are described using some form of mathematical notation, which can in turn be >> formalized as a denotational metalanguage. For example, denotational >> semantics of functional languages >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_programming_language> often >> translate the language into domain theory >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_theory>. Denotational semantic >> descriptions can also serve as compositional translations from a programming >> language into the denotational metalanguage and used as a basis for >> designing compilers <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compiler>. >> >> Operational semantics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_semantics>, >> whereby the execution of the language is described directly (rather than by >> translation). Operational semantics loosely corresponds to interpretation >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpreter_(computing)>, although again the >> "implementation language" of the interpreter is generally a mathematical >> formalism. Operational semantics may define an abstract machine >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_machine> (such as the SECD machine >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SECD_machine>), and give meaning to phrases >> by describing the transitions they induce on states of the machine. >> Alternatively, as with the pure lambda calculus >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus>, operational semantics can >> be defined via syntactic transformations on phrases of the language itself; >> >> Axiomatic semantics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiomatic_semantics>, >> whereby one gives meaning to phrases by describing the axioms >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom> that apply to them. Axiomatic >> semantics makes no distinction between a phrase's meaning and the logical >> formulas that describe it; its meaning is exactly what can be proven about >> it in some logic. The canonical example of axiomatic semantics is Hoare >> logic <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoare_logic>. >> ————— > > All semantics are good. Not sure what you mention this. This is independent > of CT. > > > >> >> may well be well-developed, both physical and experiential semantics of new >> kinds of programs - e.g. produced by synbio - that actually go out and live >> in the real world are not yet. >> >> But to call the UC researchers "ignorant" is just name-calling. > > I said some paper are wrong when claiming that CT is refuted, and there are > ignorant people in all group of people. No need of idolatry on some special > group of people, especially when they advance thought provoking ideas. > > Saying that some people are wrong is not insult, but a checkable fact. I > wrote a letter to one of them, and we eventually agreed that there has been > some tongue-slipping, on the matter. It is not a big deal. Penrose is also > wrong on CT and on Gödel. That happens, even to good or famous mathematicians. > > Being wrong is not a problem. The problem is when people knows that they are > wrong, but continue the error, by fear of losing notoriety, or by ideology, > or god knows why. > > Bruno > > > > > I would just say that > > Nature (or the cosmos - including us and our consciousnesses - the whole > shebang, everything) is a natural* computer. If it is anything else, it is > governed by magic.
I prefer to not assume Nature, if only because it is something I try to understand. To say that Naure is the product of a computer, natural or not, is digital physics. This requires Digital Mechanism, which requires the physical reality to be a statistics on a non computable domain, so Digital Physics, although interesting for some application, cannot work for the metaphysical questions and/or the Mind-Body problem. If one “natural computer” could select among the arithmetical computations, then it will have magical abilities based on “nature”, and I could no more say yes to the doctor because I would survive "qua computatio”. I can say “yes” to the doctor, in virtue of some magic, but that is no more “mechanism”. > > That's the Natural Computing Thesis (not to pick any particular names linked > to it) > > NCT is just as good as, or better than CTT. > > * or unconventional - http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ > <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/> The problem is that “natural” is not clearly defined, nor is “unconventional”. This looks like speculating on the falsity of CT, without evidences, just to keep alive something that we don’t understand but seems attached to (Matter, Nature, as a primary thing). The move toward saying that the universe is a computer is a move in the right direction, and is better than materialism. It is the signing out of one phi_u among an infinity, and in its not entirely ruled out, although it would make our substitution level infinitely low “m”y brain becomes the entire physical universe). Why not, but then Darwinism, molecular biology, humans, becomes more difficult to explain. Even QM, which is so close to digital mechanism by many aspect, become totally mysterious. It looks like making things more complex for personal philosophical reason. Cosmin is right on the immaterialism, and you are right on mechanism, … you should do kids, we have some probability to get someone right on both mechanism and immaterialism lol Since long I am aware that those who likes my premise hate the conclusion, and those who like the conclusion hate the premise. But then science is not wishful thinking a priori (even if the Main theorem of G, the Löb’s formula, introduce a sort of wishful thinking in the picture, which I dislike, but then have to accept too! Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2f0aac96-19d3-44d9-b4c2-71b439af0dcc%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2f0aac96-19d3-44d9-b4c2-71b439af0dcc%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FB09312D-F9FA-4918-B29A-D8A62062BD06%40ulb.ac.be.
