> On 21 Jun 2019, at 14:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:35 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the expected >> value, >> >> To make my point more strongly, that is the wrong way round. Observation of >> statistics far from the expected value is what would be required to confirm >> MWI. > > I don’t see this at all. > > You obviously have not grasped the argument. In the single world picture, > there is an objective probability, so all observations must confirm this > probability, within statistical errors.
So, if you predict a laser beam split in two on a half-minor, seeing it going only on one branch would be a confirmation? That is weird. > In MWI all outcomes occur with probability one, In the 3_1 picture, but the first person (plural) does not live all experience, and Everett, or the mechanist indeterminacy, is concerned only with the first person prediction. > so all possible sequences of results are certain to occur. Not in the first person view, which is what matter. > If one sees a sequence that is improbable on the single world view, it is > more likely that one is observing one of the certainly existing sequences in > MWI. Yet, the first person probabilities must be the same as in the objective probability case. You have the same chance to be the 1/100 copy that to get the 1/100 singular outcome. If you get it, you have no means to ascertain that it comes from objective bad luck relatively to a singular events, or just first person bad luck in a multiplication experiment. Both probabilities are given by the same binomial distribution. > >> The fact that we don't observe such results is the strongest possible case >> against MWI! > > ? > > The probability to see a deviation is the same in both Everett, and > Copenhagen. > > That is not the case. Because in Everett there is no objective probability > for the occurrence. There is an objective account of the first person probability. > Or at least, observation cannot establish such a single probability value -- > all outcomes are realised for certain, Not from the relative first person perspective. > and one does not have any independent evidence about what branch one is on. > In the single world model, there is a theoretical probability, and all > observations must be dependent on this underlying distribution. > > The deviation expected is the same, so if there is a deviation, it can hardly > be used to claim one theory is more correct than the other. > > The deviation is more likely in many worlds, since one can be on any branch > in that theory. Deviations are more common. There is a debate on how the probabilities emerge in QM, even with the MW, but if you take the simple frequency operator approach, like in Preskill’s course, the probabilities are the same as in single world QM. I don’t see why the fact that all outcomes are realised would change the first person confirmation. P(Moscow) = P(Washington) = 1/2 in self-duplication, independently of the fact that we could decide to reconstitute or not the candidate randomly on one branch. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BA36081E-F176-49CD-87DE-E747B8C46045%40ulb.ac.be.
