On 6/21/2019 5:50 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:35 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from
the expected value,
To make my point more strongly, that is the wrong way round.
Observation of statistics far from the expected value is what
would be required to confirm MWI.
I don’t see this at all.
You obviously have not grasped the argument. In the single world
picture, there is an objective probability, so all observations must
confirm this probability, within statistical errors. In MWI all
outcomes occur with probability one, so all possible sequences of
results are certain to occur. If one sees a sequence that is
improbable on the single world view, it is more likely that one is
observing one of the certainly existing sequences in MWI.
More likely than one is observing a low probability sequence in CI?
No...exactly the same degree of likely.
The fact that we don't observe such results is the strongest
possible case against MWI!
?
The probability to see a deviation is the same in both Everett,
and Copenhagen.
That is not the case. Because in Everett there is no objective
probability for the occurrence. Or at least, observation cannot
establish such a single probability value -- all outcomes are realised
for certain, and one does not have any independent evidence about what
branch one is on. In the single world model, there is a theoretical
probability, and all observations must be dependent on this underlying
distribution.
In Everett exactly the same distribution is found by assuming the
branches conform to the Born rule. I agree that MWI has a problem in
modeling probabilities which are real numbers for example, which require
effectively infinite numbers of branches to be modeled by branch
counting. But in Bruno's theory he has already assumed infinitely many
worlds (computations).
The deviation expected is the same, so if there is a deviation, it
can hardly be used to claim one theory is more correct than the
other.
The deviation is more likely in many worlds, since one can be on any
branch in that theory. Deviations are more common.
That's not true. MWI uses the same Born rule. That's one of the
criticisms of it: that it cannot derive the Born rule and so doesn't
really add anything empirically testable.
Brent
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
an email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com
<https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/91e06cc4-26f5-5311-1c78-3e39ec766fd8%40verizon.net.
