> On 21 Jun 2019, at 22:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/21/2019 5:50 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:35 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the expected >>> value, >>> >>> To make my point more strongly, that is the wrong way round. Observation of >>> statistics far from the expected value is what would be required to confirm >>> MWI. >> >> I don’t see this at all. >> >> You obviously have not grasped the argument. In the single world picture, >> there is an objective probability, so all observations must confirm this >> probability, within statistical errors. In MWI all outcomes occur with >> probability one, so all possible sequences of results are certain to occur. >> If one sees a sequence that is improbable on the single world view, it is >> more likely that one is observing one of the certainly existing sequences in >> MWI. > > More likely than one is observing a low probability sequence in CI? > No...exactly the same degree of likely. > >> >>> The fact that we don't observe such results is the strongest possible case >>> against MWI! >> >> ? >> >> The probability to see a deviation is the same in both Everett, and >> Copenhagen. >> >> That is not the case. Because in Everett there is no objective probability >> for the occurrence. Or at least, observation cannot establish such a single >> probability value -- all outcomes are realised for certain, and one does not >> have any independent evidence about what branch one is on. In the single >> world model, there is a theoretical probability, and all observations must >> be dependent on this underlying distribution. > > In Everett exactly the same distribution is found by assuming the branches > conform to the Born rule. I agree that MWI has a problem in modeling > probabilities which are real numbers for example, which require effectively > infinite numbers of branches to be modeled by branch counting. But in > Bruno's theory he has already assumed infinitely many worlds (computations).
Just to insist on key point, even if not relevant here. I do not assume any computations. I prove there existence from very elementary arithmetic, and that is hardly original, it is well done in Tarski, Mostowski, Robinson papers (republished in a thin Dover book). > >> >> The deviation expected is the same, so if there is a deviation, it can >> hardly be used to claim one theory is more correct than the other. >> >> The deviation is more likely in many worlds, since one can be on any branch >> in that theory. Deviations are more common. > > That's not true. MWI uses the same Born rule. That's one of the criticisms > of it: that it cannot derive the Born rule and so doesn't really add anything > empirically testable. Yes. If Bruce was correct, we would have a new mean to test MWI. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruce >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/91e06cc4-26f5-5311-1c78-3e39ec766fd8%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/91e06cc4-26f5-5311-1c78-3e39ec766fd8%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C122C6C6-31DC-4491-85EE-C6274E3E25D3%40ulb.ac.be.
