On Saturday, July 6, 2019 at 1:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Jul 2019, at 05:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, July 5, 2019 at 9:27:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Jul 2019, at 10:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, July 4, 2019 at 3:31:27 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 3 Jul 2019, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>  
>>
>>> > You may be able to access your subjective time, but does it provide a 
>>> measure...and if so what is it? 
>>>
>>>
>>  
>>
>>> We get three candidates for the logic of the measure one, given by the 
>>> logic of the intensional variant of G ([]p): 
>>>
>>> []p & p 
>>> []p & <>t 
>>> []p & <>t & p 
>>>
>>> With “[]” = Gödel’s beweisbar, and p is any  sigma_1 arithmetical 
>>> sentences (it models the Universal dovetailing). 
>>>
>>> If that logic verifies some technical condition (described by Von Neuman 
>>> in some papers), the logic should provides the entire probability calculus, 
>>> as it has to do if Mechanism is correct. 
>>>
>>> G and G* splits both []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p. So we get 5 logics, 
>>> but normally, only the starred logic should provides the measure, because 
>>> it depends on the true structure made by the 1p experiences, and not the 
>>> experienced experiences. Our future depends non locally of all our existing 
>>> “preparation” or “reconstitution” that exists in the (sigma_1) arithmetic 
>>>  (the universal dovetailer). 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> If that above is a correct *experientiality logic*, then what would be a 
>> 'machine' -- defined in terms of physics (or chemistry or biology) -- to 
>> execute it?
>>
>> We know one 'machine' exists: our brain. But what machine is that?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That’s a very good question, but not an easy one, especially if you are 
>> not familiar with the “universal dovetailer argument” and our 
>> self-multiplication in arithmetic. 
>>
>> The brain exist phenomenologically, and it is not a machine, even if it 
>> is something which supports computation. In fact it is the same for a 
>> computer.
>>
>> You could say that a brain or a computer is a digital machine (supporting 
>> our computation), but that it is itself supported by an infinity of 
>> computations. Intuitively (accepting classical quantum physics momentarily) 
>> a piece of matter is a map of all the realities you will access if you 
>> attempt to figure out some aspect of those sub-level computations. You can 
>> imagine that there is one computation for each possible position (and 
>> momentum) of each electron in that piece of matter, and the electron itself 
>> is a complicated invariant of some possible field. But the multiplication 
>> can be triggered by the observation, by some alien, even far away, of its 
>> own piece of matter. Such a multiplication is contaminated by the alien to 
>> you, at the speed of light (or below) assuming again the physics of today 
>> (which we seem to recover until now).
>>
>> It is certainly hard to imagine: a brain our a physical computer is made 
>> up of the histories we can share, and which are supported by the infinitely 
>> many computations (which are run in Arithmetic) with more details than we 
>> need to have our computational state. 
>> An image would be that a piece of matter is made of those computations, 
>> but that is still a misleading metaphor, as matter is not something made of 
>> anything, but is more like a qualia (a first person notion), which we can 
>> share among locally independent universal machine.
>>
>> I can argue, that both intuitively (with some many-world account of QM) 
>> and formally (using the self-reference logics and the quantum logical 
>> formalism) that nature confirms this (with some degree), but that will not 
>> help, QM itself does not admit simple interpretation, and there is no 
>> unanimity of how to interpret it. Mechanism makes this both more simple 
>> (the many computations are easy to study), and more complex, because the 
>> internal views are based on incompleteness which is rather 
>> counter-intuitive too.
>>
>> It is exactly what I am searching: what is matter when we understand that 
>> the physical reality is more like an infinity of computer simulation 
>> interfering statistically? The math, a bit like with the current physical 
>> theories, can only give epistemic observable and predictions rules, and 
>> that is how we can test mechanism experimentally. Matter conceived as 
>> something made of tiny particles is a concept that we need to abandon: they 
>> are abstract feature introduce by ourself when we look at things, but with 
>> a very general notion of ourself (all universal machines in arithmetic). 
>> The math suggest that the “bottom” of the physical reality is a highly 
>> symmetrical structure which is highly not symmetrical from the perspective 
>> of the average universal number in arithmetic.
>>
>> I hope this helps. I will make a glossary which should add more help, 
>> soon or a bit later,
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> The Kantian perspective is
>
>              logic-of-X ≠ X-in-itself 
>
> -- which is noumena, or matter.
>
> All our conceptions of the world are prisoners of our logic (languages).
>
>
> That is a good reason to make clear which logic we are using. The use of 
> the classical (usual) Church-Turing thesis means that we use classical 
> logic in the base Turing-universal ontology . We need that a program, when 
> enacted (on some input, or not) will either stop, or not stop, 
> independently of us knowing which is the case. 
> Then the phenomenologies (which emerges from incompleteness) get their own 
> logic (intuitionist for the first person) and quantum for the material 
> self-modes.
>
> Cf:
>
> p, 
> []p
> []p & p   first person mode
> []p & <>t material mode
> []p & <>t & p. Material and first person mode
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


Whatever logic it is, its semantics (of a theory in that logic) is the 
elephant in the room.

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory
e.g. *Whereas universal algebra provides the semantics for a signature, 
logic provides the syntax.*
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/

*Semantics is the wild, wild west of logic.*

@philipthrift

 

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