On Wednesday, July 10, 2019 at 4:31:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Jul 2019, at 21:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, July 9, 2019 at 6:52:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 8 Jul 2019, at 12:42, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, July 8, 2019 at 4:58:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 6 Jul 2019, at 13:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, July 6, 2019 at 1:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 6 Jul 2019, at 05:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>> Whatever logic it is, its semantics (of a theory in that logic) is the >>> elephant in the room. >>> >>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic >>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory >>> e.g. *Whereas universal algebra provides the semantics for a signature, >>> logic provides the syntax.* >>> - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ >>> >>> *Semantics is the wild, wild west of logic.* >>> >>> >>> >>> You might try to make a point, perhaps. Semantic is obviously very >>> important. >>> >>> Logic can be divided in three chapters: >>> >>> - theory of theories and proofs (cf Gödel) >>> >>> - semantics (Model theory) (cf Lowenheim, Skolem and Tarski, Mostowski, >>> …) >>> >>> - the relation between, theories and models, that is the study of (all) >>> theories and all their semantics, usually through completeness and >>> incompleteness theorems. >>> >>> Semantic is the heart of “modern logic”. I do avoid using it here to >>> much, because it is quickly rather technical. I hope people have some idea >>> that the structure (N, 0, +, *) (which is the set N with the usual standard >>> interpretation of + and *) is a model of both RA and PA. I might say a bit >>> more in the glossary I am preparing. All “rich” theories have infinitely >>> many non isomorphic models, and by incompleteness no theories at all can >>> study its own semantics, but some theories can still say a lot about it, >>> like its own incompleteness. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> Semantics is real thing, so to speak, to me. >> >> There are two types of semantics: >> >> *Fictional* - regarding all the mathematical structures of standard >> model theory you refer to above (Hartry Field) >> >> >> The non standard model would be less fictional? >> >> The word “fiction” can be misleading. I prefer to use “immaterial”, or >> “spiritual”, or “mental”, perhaps. >> >> >> >> *Material* - things/entities in the material world >> >> >> Those are important, but if we assume mechanism, I don’t think we can >> assume matter, but we can explain its appearances from the machine’s >> consciousness theory (theology) and test it empirically. Up to now, the >> evidences favours mechanism. >> >> >> >> >> >> Semantics and substrates are connected, it not identical. That's my blog. >> >> >> I can’t really make sense of this. >> >> >> >> >> Also >> >> There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between >> natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians. (Richard >> Montague) >> >> >> For a monist, the difference between natural and artificial is >> artificial, and indeed natural for those entities which develop a big ego >> and feel different. >> >> Of course there is a difference between the formal languages and the >> “natural” languages, and Richard Montague attempt to develop a sort of >> polymodal rich lambda calculus for the treatment of natural language is >> very interesting. >> So I appreciate your opinion that there is no fundamental difference >> between those type of languages. When I was younger I have made a universal >> programming language (ANIMA° which was also a subset of natural language >> (English). You could ask the computer things like, “could you please find a >> file with some document on number in my computer, and if not, on the net?”. >> But it was very slow, and people prefer shortcuts … >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > Semantics and substrates are connected, *if *not identical. [corrected] > > I first learned mathematical logic - ML (up to the incompleteness > theorems) - in the summer of 1970 (I was 17) at The Ohio State University > Ross Mathematics Program [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_Ross#Ross_Mathematics_Program ]. So > I've known about the models/interpretations of ML since then. > > Going from ML to programming, semantics gets more interesting > > *Modeling Languages:* > *Syntax, Semantics and all that Stuff* > *(or, What’s the Semantics of “Semantics”?)* > > http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.3075&rep=rep1&type=pdf > > "Motivated by the confusion surrounding the proper definition of complex > modeling languages, especially the UML, we discuss the distinction between > syntax and true semantics, and the nature and purpose of each." > > Now that we are entering the age of the *matter compiler,* once SF, now > getting real, > > Neal Stephenson’s *The Diamond Age *(1995) > https://csi.asu.edu/project-archive/optimism/the-diamond-age-technology/ > > the semantics of programs lie in the materiality (substrate) of their > expression. > > > I know what semantics is. I don’t know what matter is, but I do know that > if we are digitalisable machine, then matter is a secondary notion entirely > explainable, without material ontological commitment, from the theory of > the digital immaterial machine. As this gives a many-histories > interpretation of arithmetic rather well confirmed by QM-without-collapse, > I tend to take contemporary physics as confining immaterialism. > > Matter and physical implementations are important for the applications, > but it is a red herring in metaphysics and theology. I think. > It is up to a believer in matter to explain what is matter and how it > could interfere with the arithmetical computations, or to abandon mechanism > and provide a non mechanist theory of mind (which will also requires the > study of computability). > > What I have given is a way to test the existence of primitive matter > (versus Mechanism), and up to now, there are no evidence for it. > > Bruno > > > > In an ironic way, it is panpsychism (William James) that leads to actual materialism. If experience (Galen Strawson) is a real thing (or experiences/qualia) that cannot be reduced (Philip Goff) to arithmetic/logic (of whatever order or modality), then matter is that which provides that which is missing. If no computer scientist will ever make a conscious machine out of whatever size network of ARM (or even QuARM) processors running its native machine code, then that's a clue.
(ot course on could go the total consciousness/qualia monism route, but that is another problem-maker) @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e8ad1371-dfd0-4f33-a54f-c5a42bdab30f%40googlegroups.com.
