> On 10 Jul 2019, at 11:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, July 10, 2019 at 4:31:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 9 Jul 2019, at 21:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, July 9, 2019 at 6:52:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 8 Jul 2019, at 12:42, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, July 8, 2019 at 4:58:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 6 Jul 2019, at 13:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, July 6, 2019 at 1:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 6 Jul 2019, at 05:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Whatever logic it is, its semantics (of a theory in that logic) is the >>>> elephant in the room. >>>> >>>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic> >>>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory> >>>> e.g. Whereas universal algebra provides the semantics for a signature, >>>> logic provides the syntax. >>>> - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ >>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/> >>>> >>>> Semantics is the wild, wild west of logic. >>> >>> >>> You might try to make a point, perhaps. Semantic is obviously very >>> important. >>> >>> Logic can be divided in three chapters: >>> >>> - theory of theories and proofs (cf Gödel) >>> >>> - semantics (Model theory) (cf Lowenheim, Skolem and Tarski, Mostowski, …) >>> >>> - the relation between, theories and models, that is the study of (all) >>> theories and all their semantics, usually through completeness and >>> incompleteness theorems. >>> >>> Semantic is the heart of “modern logic”. I do avoid using it here to much, >>> because it is quickly rather technical. I hope people have some idea that >>> the structure (N, 0, +, *) (which is the set N with the usual standard >>> interpretation of + and *) is a model of both RA and PA. I might say a bit >>> more in the glossary I am preparing. All “rich” theories have infinitely >>> many non isomorphic models, and by incompleteness no theories at all can >>> study its own semantics, but some theories can still say a lot about it, >>> like its own incompleteness. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> Semantics is real thing, so to speak, to me. >>> >>> There are two types of semantics: >>> >>> Fictional - regarding all the mathematical structures of standard model >>> theory you refer to above (Hartry Field) >> >> The non standard model would be less fictional? >> >> The word “fiction” can be misleading. I prefer to use “immaterial”, or >> “spiritual”, or “mental”, perhaps. >> >> >> >>> Material - things/entities in the material world >> >> Those are important, but if we assume mechanism, I don’t think we can assume >> matter, but we can explain its appearances from the machine’s consciousness >> theory (theology) and test it empirically. Up to now, the evidences favours >> mechanism. >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> Semantics and substrates are connected, it not identical. That's my blog. >> >> I can’t really make sense of this. >> >> >> >>> >>> Also >>> >>> There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between natural >>> languages and the artificial languages of logicians. (Richard Montague) >> >> For a monist, the difference between natural and artificial is artificial, >> and indeed natural for those entities which develop a big ego and feel >> different. >> >> Of course there is a difference between the formal languages and the >> “natural” languages, and Richard Montague attempt to develop a sort of >> polymodal rich lambda calculus for the treatment of natural language is very >> interesting. >> So I appreciate your opinion that there is no fundamental difference between >> those type of languages. When I was younger I have made a universal >> programming language (ANIMA° which was also a subset of natural language >> (English). You could ask the computer things like, “could you please find a >> file with some document on number in my computer, and if not, on the net?”. >> But it was very slow, and people prefer shortcuts … >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Semantics and substrates are connected, if not identical. [corrected] >> >> I first learned mathematical logic - ML (up to the incompleteness theorems) >> - in the summer of 1970 (I was 17) at The Ohio State University Ross >> Mathematics Program [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_Ross#Ross_Mathematics_Program >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_Ross#Ross_Mathematics_Program> ]. So >> I've known about the models/interpretations of ML since then. >> >> Going from ML to programming, semantics gets more interesting >> >> Modeling Languages: >> Syntax, Semantics and all that Stuff >> (or, What’s the Semantics of “Semantics”?) >> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.3075&rep=rep1&type=pdf >> >> <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.3075&rep=rep1&type=pdf> >> >> "Motivated by the confusion surrounding the proper definition of complex >> modeling languages, especially the UML, we discuss the distinction between >> syntax and true semantics, and the nature and purpose of each." >> >> Now that we are entering the age of the matter compiler, once SF, now >> getting real, >> >> Neal Stephenson’s The Diamond Age (1995) >> https://csi.asu.edu/project-archive/optimism/the-diamond-age-technology/ >> <https://csi.asu.edu/project-archive/optimism/the-diamond-age-technology/> >> >> the semantics of programs lie in the materiality (substrate) of their >> expression. > > I know what semantics is. I don’t know what matter is, but I do know that if > we are digitalisable machine, then matter is a secondary notion entirely > explainable, without material ontological commitment, from the theory of the > digital immaterial machine. As this gives a many-histories interpretation of > arithmetic rather well confirmed by QM-without-collapse, I tend to take > contemporary physics as confining immaterialism. > > Matter and physical implementations are important for the applications, but > it is a red herring in metaphysics and theology. I think. > It is up to a believer in matter to explain what is matter and how it could > interfere with the arithmetical computations, or to abandon mechanism and > provide a non mechanist theory of mind (which will also requires the study of > computability). > > What I have given is a way to test the existence of primitive matter (versus > Mechanism), and up to now, there are no evidence for it. > > Bruno > > > > > In an ironic way, it is panpsychism (William James) that leads to actual > materialism. If experience (Galen Strawson) is a real thing (or > experiences/qualia) that cannot be reduced (Philip Goff) to arithmetic/logic > (of whatever order or modality), then matter is that which provides that > which is missing.
Is this not similar as the use of God in an explanation for filling a hole in it? I don’t know what is (primary matter). Physicists measure measurable numbers, and infer mathematical relations between those measurable numbers. Before quantum mechanics, we could still believe that those measurable numbers reflect some reality, (cf Einstein’s definition of physical reality), but this avenue lead to difficulties, and there is no unanimity among physicists on how to interpret the number relations that they infer. Worst, there is still no unifying theory of the 3p forces in Nature. When I ask some explanation, eventually people define matter ostensively, which brings the usual “dream-argument-like” problems. Then, the assumption of primary matter is never used in physics. So, why decide that something as unintelligible as matter exist, when it can be shown incompatible with Mechanism (used in biology, and confirmed by physics). Especially that the theory given by the universal machine already explains in all details where and how consciousness and the appearance of matter exist, and why they are non reducible to any 3p notion definable by the machine? > If no computer scientist will ever make a conscious machine out of whatever > size network of ARM (or even QuARM) processors running its native machine > code, then that's a clue. The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me. > > (ot course on could go the total consciousness/qualia monism route, but that > is another problem-maker) Yes, it is about the same error than postulating matter or God. Those things can be explained from much simpler, like the theory just above, or by elementary,tary arithmetic (those theories are Turing-equivalent). Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e8ad1371-dfd0-4f33-a54f-c5a42bdab30f%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e8ad1371-dfd0-4f33-a54f-c5a42bdab30f%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/399AFD97-E182-4077-B32D-66450548F63C%40ulb.ac.be.
