> On 9 Jul 2019, at 21:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, July 9, 2019 at 6:52:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 8 Jul 2019, at 12:42, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, July 8, 2019 at 4:58:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 6 Jul 2019, at 13:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, July 6, 2019 at 1:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 6 Jul 2019, at 05:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Whatever logic it is, its semantics (of a theory in that logic) is the >>> elephant in the room. >>> >>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic> >>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory> >>> e.g. Whereas universal algebra provides the semantics for a signature, >>> logic provides the syntax. >>> - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ >>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/> >>> >>> Semantics is the wild, wild west of logic. >> >> >> You might try to make a point, perhaps. Semantic is obviously very >> important. >> >> Logic can be divided in three chapters: >> >> - theory of theories and proofs (cf Gödel) >> >> - semantics (Model theory) (cf Lowenheim, Skolem and Tarski, Mostowski, …) >> >> - the relation between, theories and models, that is the study of (all) >> theories and all their semantics, usually through completeness and >> incompleteness theorems. >> >> Semantic is the heart of “modern logic”. I do avoid using it here to much, >> because it is quickly rather technical. I hope people have some idea that >> the structure (N, 0, +, *) (which is the set N with the usual standard >> interpretation of + and *) is a model of both RA and PA. I might say a bit >> more in the glossary I am preparing. All “rich” theories have infinitely >> many non isomorphic models, and by incompleteness no theories at all can >> study its own semantics, but some theories can still say a lot about it, >> like its own incompleteness. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Semantics is real thing, so to speak, to me. >> >> There are two types of semantics: >> >> Fictional - regarding all the mathematical structures of standard model >> theory you refer to above (Hartry Field) > > The non standard model would be less fictional? > > The word “fiction” can be misleading. I prefer to use “immaterial”, or > “spiritual”, or “mental”, perhaps. > > > >> Material - things/entities in the material world > > Those are important, but if we assume mechanism, I don’t think we can assume > matter, but we can explain its appearances from the machine’s consciousness > theory (theology) and test it empirically. Up to now, the evidences favours > mechanism. > > > >> >> >> Semantics and substrates are connected, it not identical. That's my blog. > > I can’t really make sense of this. > > > >> >> Also >> >> There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between natural >> languages and the artificial languages of logicians. (Richard Montague) > > For a monist, the difference between natural and artificial is artificial, > and indeed natural for those entities which develop a big ego and feel > different. > > Of course there is a difference between the formal languages and the > “natural” languages, and Richard Montague attempt to develop a sort of > polymodal rich lambda calculus for the treatment of natural language is very > interesting. > So I appreciate your opinion that there is no fundamental difference between > those type of languages. When I was younger I have made a universal > programming language (ANIMA° which was also a subset of natural language > (English). You could ask the computer things like, “could you please find a > file with some document on number in my computer, and if not, on the net?”. > But it was very slow, and people prefer shortcuts … > > Bruno > > > > > Semantics and substrates are connected, if not identical. [corrected] > > I first learned mathematical logic - ML (up to the incompleteness theorems) > - in the summer of 1970 (I was 17) at The Ohio State University Ross > Mathematics Program [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_Ross#Ross_Mathematics_Program > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_Ross#Ross_Mathematics_Program> ]. So > I've known about the models/interpretations of ML since then. > > Going from ML to programming, semantics gets more interesting > > Modeling Languages: > Syntax, Semantics and all that Stuff > (or, What’s the Semantics of “Semantics”?) > http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.3075&rep=rep1&type=pdf > > "Motivated by the confusion surrounding the proper definition of complex > modeling languages, especially the UML, we discuss the distinction between > syntax and true semantics, and the nature and purpose of each." > > Now that we are entering the age of the matter compiler, once SF, now getting > real, > > Neal Stephenson’s The Diamond Age (1995) > https://csi.asu.edu/project-archive/optimism/the-diamond-age-technology/ > > the semantics of programs lie in the materiality (substrate) of their > expression.
I know what semantics is. I don’t know what matter is, but I do know that if we are digitalisable machine, then matter is a secondary notion entirely explainable, without material ontological commitment, from the theory of the digital immaterial machine. As this gives a many-histories interpretation of arithmetic rather well confirmed by QM-without-collapse, I tend to take contemporary physics as confining immaterialism. Matter and physical implementations are important for the applications, but it is a red herring in metaphysics and theology. I think. It is up to a believer in matter to explain what is matter and how it could interfere with the arithmetical computations, or to abandon mechanism and provide a non mechanist theory of mind (which will also requires the study of computability). What I have given is a way to test the existence of primitive matter (versus Mechanism), and up to now, there are no evidence for it. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d7e9e7b6-f5ef-4e67-bf59-1fc8643e3a41%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d7e9e7b6-f5ef-4e67-bf59-1fc8643e3a41%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5B581F1D-65A0-43A1-BE0E-E61AFF35A0BC%40ulb.ac.be.
