> On 12 Jul 2019, at 21:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 7/12/2019 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> I have only precise definition and theorem. You can always cricicze >> definitions, but then provide better one please. > > When you are defining something that everyone supposedly knows, then the > definition is ostensive. A descriptive definition must pick out that thing > from all the possible known things. > >> >> The definition given here justify why ([]p & <>t & p) describe qualia, and >> why we recover quanta from the wearability of some type of qualia among >> different universal machine. > > No, it only shows there are some common attributes between the model and > qualia. You have picked out those attributes and claimed they define > consciousness. But they don't define (demarcate) the consciousness we know > ostensively.
I am not sure we can “define” consciousness, or even anything, ostensively. We can give examples only. If you tell me “that is the moon” ostensively, then when seeing Mars, I will say “oh, there is a moon too there too”. You will need to add an infinity of precision to get near an ostensive *definition*. And then I could wake up, also. By a “definition", I mean a formula of arithmetic, or a meta-formula (using also some arithmetical set not definable in arithmetic, but definable in set theory, say). We cannot define, in your sense of definition, what is a natural number. But that is not a problem for mechanism, or for reasoning on all this. Mathematical logic is the science which has solved all issues here, but I am aware it is not so easy. The problem us that mathematical logic is not well taught. All my books claim on the back cover that it is readable for philosophers, but I am not sure this is taught to philosophers, and still less to physicists or even to most mathematicians. We should try to avoid referring to ontological commitment, make clear on what we agree, and proceed. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/48987066-19a3-8cb4-b0b5-035e04d92db3%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FC98824F-20A2-434D-92EA-3B7BAFF534EB%40ulb.ac.be.
