ERRATA:
> On 12 Jul 2019, at 11:56, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On 12 Jul 2019, at 03:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 11:09 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> > On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> > <[email protected] >>> > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = >>> >> xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave >>> >> some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me. >>> > >>> > Which in it self is a reductio of your theory. >>> >>> Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given >>> (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then >>> SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology >>> applicable to it. >>> >>> Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often >>> criticised you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and >>> claim identity. >> >> >> Not identity, but equivalence. >> >> Is not identity an equivalence relationship? You are chopping logic. > > Identity is an equivalence, but equivalence is not an identity. You are > confusing p -> q and q -> p. > > > >> >> Conscience is a general term, like cat and dog are both quadrupeds mammals. >> You are criticising the axiomatic method. >> >> Science is not axiomatic. > > Of course. But it can use the axiomatic method. > > > >> >> I certainly do not identify the many consciousness possible, as numerous as >> possible persons, human or not, and in fact, the works shows the existence >> of very variate forms of consciousness. >> >> It is not because both dog and cat are quadrupeds mammals that Dog = Cat. >> >> No, one can point to many more dissimilarities than there are similarities. >> So your attempt at equivalence or identity between your pathetically >> inadequate definition of consciousness and your combinator logic fails at >> every level. > > Where? Specifically. > > (But your use of “pathetically” suggest me that you have not yet studied the > subject, and that your agenda is just a destructive one, you don’t seem > interested in the problem). > > > > >> In other words, you have not 'explained' consciousness -- you are not even >> talking about consciousness as usually understood. > > Can you explain what is missing? Or if you know a better theory (than > Mechanism). > > I have only precise definition and theorem. You can always cricicze > definitions, but then provide better one please. > > The definition given here justify why ([]p & <>t & p) describe qualia, and > why we recover quanta from the wearability I meant “sharability” of course. > of some type of qualia among different universal machine. I meant “machines”. Sorry for my spelling (and the aggravation due to the automatic speller). Each time you see “Sexy”, please replace by Sxyz. Pfft…. Bruno > > I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist > believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery > in violent hate and defamation). > > Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask > specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If > you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it > here. > > > >> >> But if you are OK that consciousness is characterised by the quasi axiomatic >> I give, then all universal machine can be said to be conscious, and the >> Löbian machine can be said to be self-conscious. >> >> I reject your definition of consciousness as totally inadequate. As Brent >> points out, it does not even begin to cover important aspects of >> consciousness, such as awareness of an environment. > > Not only it explains awareness of an environment, but it explains why that > the observable with respect of that environment obeys quantum logic > (formally), and even more simply, why the universal machine executed in > arithmetic discover soon or later the “many-worlds” appearances. > > Also, physics fails on this. It miss awareness, and use a brain-mind identity > thesis which is incompatible with Mechanism to link the experimental evidence > with the first person view. And that is obvious with mechanism, but well > known by the expert, even without Mechanism. It is called the mind-body > problem. > > > > >> >>> Very poor logic, I must say. >> >> It is called the axiomatic method, and it is the jewel brought by modern >> logic. The idea is to characterise things by searching some principles on >> which we agree about those things, letting open that we might later add >> incompatible proposition to gives different examples of the thing, like we >> could add “barking” to "quadruplet mammals” if we want distinguish dog from >> cat. >> >> And we could add "interacting with an environment", or "capable of >> autonomous action", or "can pass a Turing Test" to the list of >> characteristics of consciousness. None of these additional features are >> satisfied by your combinators, > > Do you have a proof of this? > > > > >> so your equivalence relationship is far from being satisfied. >> >> >> Since Gödel we have good reason for doing that, because we know that all >> concepts “rich enough” cannot be defined at all, but can be characterised by >> first order logical axiomatic system, or by definition *in* such system. We >> can’t do better a priori, unless we are gods or something non Turing >> emulable. All theories about computer programs are essentially undecidable, >> and most concept there are not univocally definable: you need to add non >> computable set of postulates to characterise them univocally, which of >> course cannot be done. >> >>> "True, knowable, non-provable, definable without invoking truth" is but a >>> poor definition of consciousness, >> That is an opinion, and I have no clue why you say this. >> >> That would suggest that you don't know what consciousness is. > > Can you provide arguments or give specific counter-examples. It looks like > you are speculating on negative possible failures. That can be done with any > theory. > > > > > > >> >> Keep in mind that we have already precise mathematical definition of truth >> (for the simple Löbian machine), provable, knowable, non-definable, and that >> all what <I say makes sense thanks to the theorems of Gödel 1931, and Löb >> 1955, and Solovay 1976 (on G and G*). >> >> What has 'truth' got to do with it? > > It has to do with the fact that for a conscious entity, that consciousnesss > is lived as a truth. It means that consciousness is a semantical notion. You > can relate it with another definition of consciousness that I have given; the > knowledge (true belief) in a reality. This use Gödel’s completeness theorem: > a theory is consistent if and only if the theory has a model. > > > >> Is an axiom conscious? > > An axiome alone, certainly not. But an axiom together with inference rule and > a model: it can be. > > > >> >>> even if it may be a property of your feeble combinators >> Feeble? >> >> Yes, feeble. You put your combinators and a logic text into a room and shut >> the door. They couldn't even report back the colour of the wallpaper, much >> less initiate any autonomous action, or pass a Turing test. > > You are assuming here that Digital Mechanism is false, In that case, my > theorem remains valid, even if the conclusion does no more apply. But I am > not interested in discussing truth of falsity of theories, prefer to derive > experimental means to test the theories. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Bruce >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRPshfFByAsJHw5WcVNJ0sB%2BW6h-ZorC-%3Dj-mA-w9j5rQ%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRPshfFByAsJHw5WcVNJ0sB%2BW6h-ZorC-%3Dj-mA-w9j5rQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D191CAAF-790D-4734-BC69-E9C98D3667A4%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D191CAAF-790D-4734-BC69-E9C98D3667A4%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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