> On 14 Jul 2019, at 11:53, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 4:08:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 13 Jul 2019, at 23:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 3:41:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 20:38, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 9:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist >>>> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny >>>> mockery in violent hate and defamation). >>>> >>>> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask >>>> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If >>>> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain >>>> it here. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I was thinking we (real) materialists are mocked today. :) >>> >>> Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are >>> boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is >>> implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist. >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just >>>> information [number] processing, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, >>>> Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming today's anti-materialists. >>> >>> >>> They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. >>> Without Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that >>> primitive matter concept. >>> >>> It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I don’t >>> need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of Matter >>> which would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction (using >>> very small amount of Occam razor). >>> >>> Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is >>> far more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and >>> Consciousness seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are >>> better to avoid when doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology. >>> >>> IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from >>> nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet >>> been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a >>> malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> There are 3 things: >>> >>> Logica >>> Qualia >>> Matter >> >> With Mechanism, those are explained in the phenomenology, so we do not need >> to assume them, except the minimal amont to define what is a digital >> machine, and that minimal amount is elementary combinator theory, or >> elementary arithmetic, etc. >> >> >>> >>> The first 2 are not real without the 3rd. >> >> That sentence is too vague. I can agree and disagree, depending of the >> theory used. >> >> >>> Without the 1st, the 3rd would be without order and would disintegrate. >>> Without the 2nd, there would be no conscious beings made of the 3rd. >>> >>> One can't untie the Trinity Knot of Being. >> >> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some >> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism. >> >> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and >> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> There are all kinds of machines, including biomachines*. All machines are >> all made of matter. If someone has an immaterial machine, then they should >> show it. >> >> I think the original sin of philosophy occurred when numbers, counting, >> arithmetic, logic, mathematics were abstracted away from their material home. > > > That is not an argument. > > If those biomachines are Turing emulable, they are emulated in infinitely > many exemplars in the arithmetical reality. > > It is not a sin, but an ontological commitment is not a valid way to argue; > > >> >> >> >> * Cornell Scientists Create Lifelike Biomachines That Eat, Grow, And Race >> Competitively >> April 22, 201 (via @HotHardware) >> https://hothardware.com/news/cornell-scientists-create-lifelike-biomachines-evolve >> >> <https://hothardware.com/news/cornell-scientists-create-lifelike-biomachines-evolve> >> >> Dan Luo [professor of biological and environmental engineering at Cornell] >> and his team developed a biomaterial that was placed into a nanoscale >> scaffolding. The material then autonomously emerged to "arrange itself – >> first into polymers and eventually mesoscale shapes. Acting much like slime >> molds, the biomaterial was able to move under its own power, moving forward >> against a liquid flow of energy. >> >> Not surprisingly, the researchers pitted these new bio machines against one >> another in competitive races – because, why not? Given the self-locomotive >> properties of each and the total randomness of the environments (and of the >> machines themselves), the team says that the race outcomes and eventual >> winners were always dynamic. >> >> Besides their racing antics and ability to sustain themselves, the Cornell >> researchers also witnessed their new machines grow, decay and eventual die >> (after two cycles of synthesis) like true living organisms. >> >> “The designs are still primitive, but they showed a new route to create >> dynamic machines from biomolecules," added Shogo Hamada, a research >> associate from the Luo lab. "We are at a first step of building lifelike >> robots by artificial metabolism. >> >> “Ultimately, the system may lead to lifelike self-reproducing machines." >> >> Luo and his team are just getting started with these machines, and hope to >> eventually advance their research to the point where this biomaterial can be >> used as biosensors in the medical field. > > Very good. All this is in favour of digital mechanism, unless you argue that > such biomachine can violate Church’s thesis, I am not sure what you cite > this. What in the “bio” part would be non Turing emulable? Usually people are > open to the idea that biology obeys the quantum laws, which are digitally > emulated in arithmetic, unless you consider some non Turing emulable > lagragian ? > > Bruno > > > > If brains (or future biomachines) are standard Turing, then we can make a > conscious robot out of standard processors.
OK. The expression is a bit fuzzy. I would say that we can make a physical robot capable of manifesting consciousness relatively to us. This is needed to avoid the idea that it is the physical activity in the brain robot which would “create” consciousness. The consciousness of the robot is eventually explained by (infinitely many) number relations, which are independent of time, physics, etc. > > That is the great leap of faith. I can agree, yes. That is why I insist all the time that Mechanism is an hypothesis, first in the cognitive science, then in metaphysics. Anyone asserting that science has proven Mechanism, or that we know that Mechanism is true is a con scientist. The machine already know this. > Panpsychism is the conservative view that only with particular material > complexes consciousness exits. My goal is to figure out what is matter and where it comes from. That is one of the main reason why I do not assume matter at the start. I don’t know what it is, and I doubt it exists ontologically, especially once you know that the tiny very elementary part of arithmetic emulate *all* computations, in a redundant fashion with a precise mathematical structure (indeed seemingly rather close to what quantum mechanics already seem to described, but that will need infinitely many confirmation, like all thesis on some reality. > > One can simulate thermonuclear fusion in a supercomputer, but it's not real. > Same with consciousness. Assuming non mechanism, and assuming a primary physical reality, you are right, but out of the scope of my working hypothesis. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/94027e5d-14ae-4138-bf22-bbd55339cc10%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/94027e5d-14ae-4138-bf22-bbd55339cc10%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/824050FF-33CC-4C96-B239-3F7443AAEFFA%40ulb.ac.be.
