> On 17 Jul 2019, at 20:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/17/2019 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 16 Jul 2019, at 19:37, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 7/16/2019 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> The consciousness of the universal machine is timeless, and spaceless. It 
>>>> is somehow 100% unfocused, without any attention, and it might plausibly 
>>>> be related to the highly dissociative state that some people seemed to 
>>>> describe in experience with some drug.
>>> And yet you have to ask me how it is that your definition of consciousness 
>>> does not comport with my experience of it??
>> You are right. I have to ask you exactly that.
>> 
>> It would have helped if  you could have been more specific.
>> 
>> Which one of the quasi-axioms does not met your experience?
>> 
>> 1) Do you think it is false to be conscious for a conscious entity?
> 
> ??  That a tautology, not a quasi-axiom.

I agree partially. But “truth” is not definable, and so this is still a 
meta-axiom, even if a trivial one. Telling me that it is tautological means 
that you agree with it. You agree that consciousness is before all a truth. Not 
all people agree with this, some claim it is an illusion, and I think we have 
already agreed that this is … a contradiction (the negation of a tautology).

Think about consistency. It is trivial that a consistent machine is consistent, 
but we have to invoke this “tautology” to better understand that if a machine 
is consistent it cannot prove that it is consistent. Similarly we have that 
consciousness is a truth that cannot be proved, nor defined, so it helps to 
make it clear that we accept it is true and thus meaningful. Some claims that 
consciousness does not exist and is an illusion, and the first axiom is used 
just to eliminate that conception in this theory.



> 
>> 
>> Or
>> 
>> 2) Do you think it is false that consciousness is (immediately, without 
>> asking an intellectual effort) knowable?
> 
> I'm not sure that's true.  I think consciousness is knowable on reflection: 
> "Yes, I was conscious of that."  But I'm not sure what "immediately" means in 
> this context.

It means that you don’t have to make a reasoning to conclude that you are 
conscious. A sort of reasoning might be done through the activity of your 
brain, but it will not be consciously made, so that from your first person 
perspective, it looks like, from the conscious first person perspective, 
consciousness is a given. 

OK?



>> 
>> Or
>> 
>> 3) Do you think it is false that consciousness is not definable (without 
>> mentioning truth or god, …)
> 
> I don't know what that means.    If I say "Consciousness is an inner 
> narrative." have I mentioned "truth" because I think that's a true statement? 
>  And what god do you refer to?  Bal, Yawheh, Zeus, Loki, Thor,...  And what 
> do they have to do with it?

Consciousness here is the brute consciousness, not the higher reflexive 
consciousness (that one is obtained with the Löbian machine, but not any 
arbitrary universal machine). When you are conscious of some pain, that does 
not need to be accompanied by a inner narrative. 



> 
>> 
>> Or
>> 
>> 4) Do you think it is false that a conscious entity cannot prove or justify 
>> rationally that it is conscious?
> 
> Yes, I think this is false.  I think a conscious entity must be able to show 
> a certain level of intelligence.

I don’t see the relation between your answer and “4)”. To say that it is false 
"that a conscious entity cannot prove or justify rationally that it is 
conscious” means that you believe that some entity can justify rationally that 
it she/him/it is conscious. 



> 
>> 
>> Or
>> 
>> 5) Do you think that something important about consciousness is missing?
> 
> Yes.  It says nothing about being conscious OF something or acting 
> intelligently.  Within that definition a rock could be conscious.

You lost me here. It is a bit like saying “I don’t accept your definition of 
group” because it does not address the abelian groups. Once we agree on 
consciousness, we can tackle the question of "conscious of”, which is rather 
subtle in the mechanist framework, as the things referred too might be the root 
of the mind-body problem. But I told you the basic idea, which is that 
consciousness mirror consistency, and consciousness of p will mirror the 
consciousness of p.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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