On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



    On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

        I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees Moscow
        and Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person /plural/.

        Brent


    Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you
    accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also
    for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.

    But does it have a clear answer?

    The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's
    straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the world
    splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are
    equi-probable).  But what if there are two possibilities and one
    is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world split into three,
    two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, can they
    really be two.  Aren't they just one? And what if there are two
    possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say
    one-in-a-thousand chance.  Does the world then split into 1001
    worlds?  And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so
    then we need infinitely many worlds. But if there are infinitely
    many worlds then every event happens infinitely many times and
    there is no natural measure of probability.

    Brent




Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.


http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/


"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without any additional assumptions."

But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times the decay might occur?

Brent

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