On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> I didn't say there was. I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and >>> Washington. "Youse-self" is second person *plural*. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept >> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's >> clear and meaningful. >> >> >> But does it have a clear answer? >> >> The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if >> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we >> implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two >> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world >> split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, >> can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two >> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand >> chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the >> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. >> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely >> many times and there is no natural measure of probability. >> >> Brent >> > > > > Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer. > > > > http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/ > > > "The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum > state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do > multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually > come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without > any additional assumptions." > > > But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does > probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to > branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And > what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's > cat box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different > times the decay might occur? > > Brent >
Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all types should be removed from physics. So there would be no "continuum of worlds". The way I think about it (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of them. (God plays Monte Carlo.) @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com.
