> On 25 Jul 2019, at 07:52, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 3:16 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > On 7/24/2019 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> Note that the personal identity is not a transitive notion. Step 3 actually >>> illustrates well this. I recall he cut and copy itself from Helsinki (H) in >>> both Washington (W) and Moscow (M). With the definition of the personal >>> identity above, both the HW and the HM guy are, from that personal identity >>> view, the same person as the H person. >>> >>> With a more sensible notion of personal identity, the copies are different >>> persons, and different persons from the original. >> >> But that would entail that you die in step 1, which would again just be your >> opinion that mechanism is false. > > Why do you assume this is all-or-nothing, live-or-die? What seems likely to > me is that the copy will be necessarily different due to information > limitations of quantum mechanics...but maybe not so different that one would > still say yes to the doctor, depending on the alternatives. > > I was talking about duplication, as in step 3. But even in step 1 the > original is "cut" after copying. So the original certainly "dies" according > to the "cut" protocol. The question is whether what survives as a copy is > sufficiently like the original to count as the same person.
That’s correct, and the digital Mechanist assumption is that the copy is a survivor when the copy is made at the right substitution, which exists too by part of the mechanist assumption. > > It seems to me that this depends on a lot of things that are left unspecified. What specifically? > Of particular concern is whether the original body is also reconstructed -- a > feat that would seem to be beyond any reasonable technology of the future. That is not relevant. The feasibility assumption is handy to do the thought experiences, and is explicitly discharged at step 7. All what counts if that is a level of substitution exists, then the arithmetical reality enacted it, in infinitely many arithmetical relations. > What you could at best achieve would be to connect the mechanical brain to > some robotic body, with maintenance of essential input and output functions. > Or even have the copy live in an entirely virtual reality, constructed within > some computer. That step 6. Then step 7 use arithmetic as the base universal machinery. > (Such possibilities are relatively common in the Sci-Fi literature.) Then, > even if memories are preserved, it is possible that the copied person might > react negatively to his/her new substitute body (or the virtual reality > environment).. This is not unknown in practice, because sometimes after > accidents that lead to severe bodily deformations, the patient rejects the > damaged body and suffers all sorts of psychological problems: PTSD being one > of the least of their worries. So although these are thought experiments, the > practical implications for real people are largely unknowable until it is > actually tried in practice. Whether this would ever be ethical is another > question……. All this is correct, but has no relevance with the reasoning, and its translation in arithmetic. None that I see, so you can elaborate perhaps. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSqJDJkVDX_7TVjO8SDr-C31tze%2BvssifffY%2B_zOm%2Bc5Q%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSqJDJkVDX_7TVjO8SDr-C31tze%2BvssifffY%2B_zOm%2Bc5Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/51E15746-BB27-48DF-9EB6-D9123FCC47E6%40ulb.ac.be.
