On 7/24/2019 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note that the personal identity is not a transitive notion. Step
3 actually illustrates well this. I recall he cut and copy itself
from Helsinki (H) in both Washington (W) and Moscow (M). With the
definition of the personal identity above, both the HW and the HM
guy are, from that personal identity view, the same person as
the H person.
With a more sensible notion of personal identity, the copies are
different persons, and different persons from the original.
But that would entail that you die in step 1, which would again just
be your opinion that mechanism is false.
Why do you assume this is all-or-nothing, live-or-die? What seems
likely to me is that the copy will be necessarily different due to
information limitations of quantum mechanics...but maybe not so
different that one would still say yes to the doctor, depending on the
alternatives.
Brent
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