On 7/27/2019 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jul 2019, at 19:31, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 7/26/2019 12:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And that is necessary with digital mechanism, where to copy any piece of matter
we would need the entire run of the universal dovetailer. Neither matter nor
consciousness are Turing emulable, but they are are “Turing borrowable” in some
sense.
Bruno
And so the duplication of your thought experiment is impossible.
Why?
Not at all. The whole point of the computationalist assumption is that we are
duplicated at some substitution level, finitely describable. The duplication
would be indeed impossible if we need to duplicate the physical brain, but with
the *digital* hypothesis we don’t need to duplicate the matter of the brain,
only the relevant functional disposition of its part.
That is the reason why matter is not copiable. We can’t duplicate the
infinitely many computations below our substitution level.
Your substitution level for WHAT? What one is willing to say "yes" to
the doctor for? That might be quite crude, depending on how desperate
you circumstances. But for you metaphysics it needs to be exact.
"Functional" is ill defined. You want it to mean "Such that
consciousness is unaffected". Yet as you often point out, consciousness
is cheap and no one would say "yes" if it only meant consciousness in
your sense were preserved.
Brent
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