> On 24 Jul 2019, at 20:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/24/2019 2:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 23 Jul 2019, at 00:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/22/2019 7:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> The only one I know for a fact to exist. >>>> >>>> Nobody can know that a world exist. You would know that you are >>>> consistent, making you inconsistent. >>> >>> A confusion of "know" and "prove”. >> >> ? >> >> On the contrary. What I said has been derived (like the whole machine >> theology) from the distinction between knowledge ([]p & p) and >> belief/prove/assume ([]p). >> >> Hmm, I think you are confusing “world” (nobody can prove that such a thing >> exist, nor know that such a thing exist) and consciousness, that nobody van >> prove that such a thing exists, but that everybody can know that it exists). > > No. You are assuming that you can only have knowledge of p if you also have > proof []p.
On the contrary, I explain that we cannot justify that []p -> p, and that is why for knowledge, we have to use []p & p instead of just []p. Proving proves nothing! After Gödel, “proving” is just rational hypothetical beliefs. Knowledge comes from personal experience, and never go out of personal experience, but we can use them to try theories/beliefs, and test their consequences. > This is essentially rejecting empirical knowledge and instead assumes that > there some axioms on which []p can be based. That is right, and that is how eventually incompleteness justifies the existence and the importance of the empirical beliefs/theories, and the personal knowledge. > >> >> >> >>> A consequence of assuming knowledge requires proof...in direct >>> contradiction to your definition of consciousness which is defined in terms >>> of immediate knowledge. >> >> Knowledge requires proof, > > Nonsense. That's what I mean by your "definition" of consciousness does not > at all comport with actual experience of consciousness. What would your > proof be based on? Proofs are only relative to axioms and rules of inference. Knowledge is []p & p. It requires proof because I limit myself to rational knowledge, but requiring does not mean that it is identify with proof. The conscious knowledge is in “p” not “[]p”. You might need to reread my posts as I insist on this since long. Proof is neither truth, nor knowledge. > > >> because the Theatetus’ sort of knowledge is limited to rational knowledge > > ?? I suspect your idea of "rational knowledge" does not comport with > anyone's idea of rational since Theatetus. It is the standard definition of knowledge since Theaetetus. See Gerson’s book on this (“ancient epistemology”). Gerson critics it, like Socrates in the Theaetetus, but the incompleteness theorem refutes Socartes, and Gerson’s refutation of it. Bruno > >> , and is defined by ([]p & p). It is when a belief/assumption is true. >> >> The immediate knowledge is in the “immediate mode” obtained from the nuance >> ([]p & <>t & p). >> >> G* proves that all modes are equivalent, and that the machine cannot be >> aware of that equivalence, and that it obeys different logic. >> >> There is one truth, the sigma_1 arithmetical truth, and very different modes >> of handling that truth, the true mode, the belief mode, the knowledge mode, >> the observable modes and the sensible modes. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b293d8af-b691-9a31-2eca-eea6668df266%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b293d8af-b691-9a31-2eca-eea6668df266%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B3D962C1-2D8D-47B5-B82A-7799B48289D4%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B3D962C1-2D8D-47B5-B82A-7799B48289D4%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5c00288a-e420-d9d2-3151-72669eb52434%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5c00288a-e420-d9d2-3151-72669eb52434%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/41FC22AD-8B4C-413D-B3EF-DE099B5E18C9%40ulb.ac.be.
