> On 26 Jul 2019, at 06:42, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 10:19 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 1:06 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Thursday, July 25, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:44 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Monday, July 22, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 11:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > On 7/22/2019 1:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, questions >> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed out >> several times. >> >> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in these >> debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. > > But what if, as seems likely to me, it is theoretically impossible to copy a > brain to a level that it undetectable, i.e. it will necessarily be possible > to distinguish physical differences. Now these differences may not matter to > consciousness, or they may imply only a brief glitch at the > conscious/classical level, but we know from Holevo's theorem that the > duplicate can't be known to be in the same state. > > I feel that I am the same person today as yesterday because I am pretty close > to the person I was yesterday, even though if you were to look at me in > enough detail, even using simple tests and instruments, I am quite different > today. It seems unreasonable to insist that a copy of a person must be closer > to the original than the "copying" that occurs in everyday life. > > Dealing with this particular worry is one of the strengths of Nozick's > 'closest continuer' theory. > > > Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal > identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of > paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. > > As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are forced > to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the zero > universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers to a > single person (like many worlds). > > ????? > > > Could you clarify your question? > > I have no idea what your statement means. > > It's an imprecise and ad-hoc revision to the theory to preserve a "singular > identity" when the situation tells us the notion of a singular identity is > inconsistent and untenable. And just as quantum mechanics undermined the idea > of a single universe/history, QI was an imprecise and ad-hoc revision added > to preserve that notion.
Yes, the notion of closer requires a precise topology to make sense. It is a vague set of theories invoked to avoid the first person indeterminacy implied by digital mechanism (or quantum mechanics). Keep in mind that Bruce rejects the digital mechanist hypothesis, and assume a primary physical reality, which makes all sort of theories possibly consistent, even materialist one, but also all religious myth. It points on a vast set of theories, without providing any one. “Closer” requires a proximity space, which is exactly what the material modes provide as I have explained a long time ago. (Cf: two computational states are close when they are not orthogonal, with the abstract quantum logical definition of perpendicularity). Bruno > > > > Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity can > always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and > changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body. > > How would one do that when psychological states are clearly closely > correlated with physical (brain) states? > > > > Bodily continuity is same physical body without discontinuities. A bit like > closest continuer theory. But there's no limit to how radically you could > alter that body over time. This is where things like ageing, amnesia, memory > loss, differentiation of twins, etc. come into play. > > Of course, and the theory deals adequately with them all. > > What is closer, a duplicate mind among: > > - two branches of the wave function containing the same mind which differ by > the location of a photon, or two branches of the wave function that differ in > the location of an electron? > - another branch of the wave function vs. 1 meter away in space? > - separated 1 second in time versus separated by 1 meter in space? > - a duplicate mind built as a physical computer that fully surrounds the > previous mind and extends 1 kilometer in all directions surrounding the > previous mind vs. a duplicate 1 meter away? > - two duplicates separated by a distance less than a plank length, but with > one being closer (does it result in two new people? How can you tell?) > - two duplicates in different reference space-time locations such that from > different reference frames there are different conclusions regarding which of > the duplicates is closer? > > I see no clear answers to these cases offered by closest continuer theory. > Nor any way to address them from within the theory. The onyl way would be to > add more ad-hoc rules, like space of any distance trumps different branches > of the wave function, ans distance in time must be less than (speed of > light*that time) to be a closer continuer, and that the reference frame to > use to break ties must be the reference frame of the original mind. None of > this is based on any rational basis, it's plugging in holes as they appear in > the theory with an ever increasing number of new theories. The same thing > happened with CI, regarding different masses or scales where superpositions > necessarily would break down. > > > > For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron, until you looked > like and had the mind of Julius Caesar. But under this continuity of the > body your psyche, as you know it, has completely disappeared. > > Continuity of the psyche preserves your mind, but is discontinuous in > physical instantiation. This is where you have transporters, duplicators, > mind simulation, substitution of brain regions, etc. > > Closest continuer theory also applies -- although it might not give the > results that you appear to want. > > It's a non-mathematical, non-formalized theory. It doesn't address the > questions it purports to answer, it only creates many more questions. > > > > Personal identity is multifactorial: it is not just psychological continuity > or just physical continuity, but a combination of those and other factors. > > > What are those factors? If personal identity requires bodily continuity you > get closest continuer theory. If it's psychological continuity you get > functionalism. If it's both you get identity only of single thought moments, > if it's neither you get universalism. > > It is not a dichotomy of that sort. The theory involves both bodily and > psychological continuity -- or at least the closest continuer in this > multifactorial space. There may not be any continuers close enough, given > some metric over the space, in which case there is no continuer. Or there may > be ties, in which case multiple new persons are formed. > > What is the difference between two new people resulting from a tie, versus > when there is no tie? Is there any subjective or objective difference > anywhere in the picture? Could it ever be tested? > > > Personal identity theories, should enable one to answer for any situation: > "what experiences belong to you?" > > Define "you" in all these cases below. > > As I said, there are only two consistent notions of "you" that remain. > 1. You are a single thought-moment > 2. All experiences are yours > > The third option, (the common sense idea), which says "Certain experiences > belong to you, and others don't" doesn't work, and can further be disproved > probabalistically. Zuboff demonstrates this in the work I cited. > > It is the result of the same class of illusions the ego plays on itself. The > illusion that makes you think there is something special about, or some > selection process was involved in selecting a: "here", "now", "branch", or > "being's perspective". In truth there is no selection process, all heres, > nows, branches, and beings are on equal footing. All heres exist, all points > in time exist, and all experiences belong to you. > > > Consider some edge cases: > - split brains > - amoeba-like splits (e.g identical twins) > - fusion of previously split brain hemispheres > - transportation > - duplication > - transportation with errors > - memory erasure > - memory swapping > - morphing to another person (with nanotechnology) > - two people morphing into each other > > If the theory of personal identity can't deal with those cases it's > incomplete, if not inconsistent. > > Closest continuer theory can provide sensible answers in all these cases, > provided one doesn't define it out of existence. With respect to 'memory > swapping' and the like, I refer you to the Thomas Mann novella: "The > Transposed Heads" (1941). > > Thanks for the reference, but that's not exactly what I mean. Zuboff gives a > scenario where two people are on operating tables side by side, and bits of > brain are transported gradually between them. At the end of the process, > would you say the two people swapped locations, or has each person morphed > into a new person? > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiC98XvaG5uAQEiPaO5M-k_ntrD62nbL6cO8YGmbLtCig%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiC98XvaG5uAQEiPaO5M-k_ntrD62nbL6cO8YGmbLtCig%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4D94072E-50B0-494E-ABA8-1D3C36280203%40ulb.ac.be.
