On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:24 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 5:12 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On 25 Jul 2019, at 18:44, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity
>> can always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and
>> changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body.
>>
>>
>> They break down with digital mechanism.
>>
>
> So what? I am not assuming mechanism. The everyday  understanding of
> personal identity was developed in a world without person duplication or
> other exotic brain experimentation. The idea is to develop a theory of
> identity that can deal with some of the more reasonable thought experiments
> without doing violence to everyday concepts. We need continuity of concepts
> as well as continuity of body and memories.
>
> With soma analog mechanism, or non-mechanism, we can’t conclude (but we
>> can also feel that such a move is ad hoc and non convincing).
>>
>
> Feeling that it is ad hoc is not necessarily a disadvantage -- until we
> actually have experience of person duplication and the like, we cannot
> reasonably expect to develop a completely satisfactory theory -- the only
> data we have to work on comes from a non-duplicating world.
>
>
>> With digital or numerical mechanism, we avoid such ad hoc move and the
>> “closer continuers” can be numerous, (even infinite)  like in Everett
>> Relative State, indeed.
>>
>
> MWI is irrelevant to this discussion, since the branches in MWI are
> completely disjoint and form separate coherent worlds. Without overlap,
> common sense notions of personal identity continue unchanged in all
> branches separately.
>
>
Can we really ignore the global view? What if we want to consider cases
like Wigner's friend?  Or cases where we emulate brains in quantum
computers?

Jason

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