On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 2:38 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 6:16 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 9:01 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 5:48 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 6:19 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> If that is true, and further, if it is the case that "you" would have >>>>> no first person experience had one of your possible brothers or sisters >>>>> been born in your stead, then it is incredible that you are alive at all. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That is still dualist. "You" are the result of a particular sperm-ovum >>>> fusion. Other sperm and abstract possibilities play no role, physical or >>>> theoretical. If you think about it, that is analogous to the misconceived >>>> "Sleeping Beauty" problem. >>>> >>> >>> It could be said that you're not only the result of a particular >>> sperm-ovum fusion, but the result of your memories and experiences. >>> >> >> Personal identity persists through changing bodily configurations and >> experiences. >> > > Do you believe there is a limit to how radically your body or experiences > might change you, while your personal identity is preserved? > Yes, of course. Some more drastic changes might kill you. Some experiences, such as hitting the ground after jumping from the 20th floor window, might also kill you. Here is a random result from a coin toss I just performed: Heads >>> >>> Now that you have the memory of having read "Heads" embedded in your >>> brain, are you telling me that "you" would not be conscious right had I >>> instead flipped "Tails"? Afterall, that would be a different you with a >>> different set of memories and experiences. >>> >> >> That is just a silly argument. Personal identity does not change in this >> way. Your memories might change, and you might lose the odd limb or two, >> but your personal identity survives intact. There is no "different you" >> after such experiences. >> > > So if a different sperm had fertilized the egg that became you, would you > still be alive? > The personal pronoun has no unambiguous reference. Zuboff is pointing to a deeper question, which I would phrase as: "What are >>> the necessary contingencies for possessing a first person experience?" >>> Ultimately he reaches the conclusion that there are no such necessary >>> contingencies other than the existence of first person experiences. >>> >> >> Maybe he misses the point that you need a physical brain. Show me some >> personal experiences that exist without such a brain. >> > > A brain is needed to for a first person experience to exist, but this > isn't the type of problem or question theories of personal identity try to > tackle. Theories of personal identity attempt to answer which experiences > belong to which persons. > > >> >> >>> If first person experiences exist, "you" have them. It isn't a dualist >>> position to say experiences have an experiencer. >>> >> >> No, it is a tautology, and tautologies seldom have any significant >> content. His argument starts from a clearly dualist position, so it is >> flawed from the outset. >> > > I think you should read beyond the abstract before drawing any firm > conclusions about his position. > Life is short. Sometimes the abstract is all one needs -- it saves one an awful lot of wasted time ploughing through ill conceived papers. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQXbn7tm2AC7A%2Bgs4CsvEdmAeFZFJQo-Jryh13jj5cQ5Q%40mail.gmail.com.
