On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 6:16 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 9:01 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 5:48 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 6:19 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> If that is true, and further, if it is the case that "you" would have >>>> no first person experience had one of your possible brothers or sisters >>>> been born in your stead, then it is incredible that you are alive at all. >>>> >>> >>> That is still dualist. "You" are the result of a particular sperm-ovum >>> fusion. Other sperm and abstract possibilities play no role, physical or >>> theoretical. If you think about it, that is analogous to the misconceived >>> "Sleeping Beauty" problem. >>> >> >> It could be said that you're not only the result of a particular >> sperm-ovum fusion, but the result of your memories and experiences. >> > > Personal identity persists through changing bodily configurations and > experiences. > Do you believe there is a limit to how radically your body or experiences might change you, while your personal identity is preserved? > > >> Here is a random result from a coin toss I just performed: Heads >> >> Now that you have the memory of having read "Heads" embedded in your >> brain, are you telling me that "you" would not be conscious right had I >> instead flipped "Tails"? Afterall, that would be a different you with a >> different set of memories and experiences. >> > > That is just a silly argument. Personal identity does not change in this > way. Your memories might change, and you might lose the odd limb or two, > but your personal identity survives intact. There is no "different you" > after such experiences. > So if a different sperm had fertilized the egg that became you, would you still be alive? > > > Zuboff is pointing to a deeper question, which I would phrase as: "What >> are the necessary contingencies for possessing a first person experience?" >> Ultimately he reaches the conclusion that there are no such necessary >> contingencies other than the existence of first person experiences. >> > > Maybe he misses the point that you need a physical brain. Show me some > personal experiences that exist without such a brain. > A brain is needed to for a first person experience to exist, but this isn't the type of problem or question theories of personal identity try to tackle. Theories of personal identity attempt to answer which experiences belong to which persons. > > >> If first person experiences exist, "you" have them. It isn't a dualist >> position to say experiences have an experiencer. >> > > No, it is a tautology, and tautologies seldom have any significant > content. His argument starts from a clearly dualist position, so it is > flawed from the outset. > > I think you should read beyond the abstract before drawing any firm conclusions about his position. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgq_%2Bu7yRY7wXG0Ye%2BaLeywHRNLsWCQSmc2qopjGAf%3DiQ%40mail.gmail.com.
