On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was when he was 3 is
>> > dead.  Too much information was added to his brain.  If his 3 year old
>> > self were suddenly replaced with his much older self, you would
>> > conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when gradual changes are
>> > made, day by day, common-sense and convention maintains that the
>> > 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives. This is the
>> > inconsistency of continuity theories.
>>
>> On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the consistency of causal
>> continuity theories.
>>
>>
> Your close friend walks into a black  box, and emerges 1 hour later.
>
> In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and a new version of
> that person was formed having the mind of your friend as it might have been
> 1 hour later.
> In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.
>
> You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this black box for
> coffee.
>
> From your point of view, neither case A nor B is physically
> distinguishable.  Yet under your casual continuity theory, your friend has
> either died or survived entering the black box.  You have no way of knowing
> if the entity you are having coffee with is your friend or not.   Is this a
> legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world?
>
>
> Did the black box take A's information in order to copy him, or did it
> make a copy accidentally.
>

Would that change the result?


>
>
> Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two things is not very
> good evidence that they are the same.
>
>
>

That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that could
differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that notions of identity
holding there to be a difference are illusory.

Jason

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