On Thursday, August 8, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 8/8/2019 2:39 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Thu, Aug 8, 2019 at 4:29 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/8/2019 2:05 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Quantum computers can emulate any classical computation. If a brain >>> emulated on a quantum computer answers "no" when asked the question "are >>> you conscious?" while the same brain emulated on a Pentium III processor >>> answers "yes" when asked the same question, then you have a violation of >>> the Church-Turing thesis. >>> >>> >> The Church-Turing thesis doesn't show that a computer must be ignorant of >> everything about it. >> > > Because any program can be run as part of an emulation of some particular > hardware implementation running that program, no program can be implemented > that can make a certain determination about its ultimate computing > substrate. This is exploited to run emulators > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_game_console_emulator> of different > gaming hardware, or virtual machines > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_machine>. This is a direct > consequence of any Turing Machine being able to simulated any other. > If a program's behavior would branch differently based on its ultimate > computing substrate, you could use this as a routine to determine the > underlying computing substrate, and it would make it impossible for one > Turing machine to simulate that other one. > > > If you are actually running the same algorithim on the quantum computer > and the Pentium III, then they must both give the same answer. So your > hypothetical has a false premise. > > Right, so then you are left with a zombie computation. (Unless you agree with me that it would be conscious). > > > > >> Have you not noticed that you can get both "yes" and "no" by polling >> human philosophers. What do you conclude from that? >> > > Different brains. > > > Different substrates? or different ideas of what "consciousness" means? > Different computations, mainly. Jason > > > > > >> >> This is a program that can determine something about its underlying >>> hardware (whether its a classical or quantum computer). If instead, you >>> hold that both emulations answer "yes", then you have a violation of the >>> anti-zombie >>> principle >>> <https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kYAuNJX2ecH2uFqZ9/the-generalized-anti-zombie-principle>. >>> Either consequence is distasteful to me. >>> >>> >>> If the quantum computer didn't decohere to a quasi-classcial mixture it >>> would answer "Yes and no." (to every question). >>> >> >> I am assuming in this example that the brain emulation is deterministic >> (no superpositions need be used as inputs). >> >> >> I don't understand the relevance of that remark. Any pure input can be >> expressed as a superposition. >> > > What I mean is that the qubits are have defined values, as either 1s or > 0s, at the start of the brain emulation. Such that the entire computation > is deterministic. > > > So the system is represented by a vector in Hilbert space whose > dimensionality is 2x(number of qubits). It is just one vector in this > space. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > msgid/everything-list/e7903fd3-433d-c455-99d0-b88c82fed109%40verizon.net > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e7903fd3-433d-c455-99d0-b88c82fed109%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjSJtXoa9t02Omg-G4iQqx3hfD1zgdy4QT-iueHkC0bFw%40mail.gmail.com.
