On Thu, Aug 8, 2019 at 1:24 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 8/8/2019 3:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 7, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/7/2019 8:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 4:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 8/7/2019 2:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 2:23 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 8/7/2019 8:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> > This is made most clear in the case of a quantum computer. Where the >>>> > quantum computer can be viewed as one WORLD (def 1) that contains >>>> many >>>> > little worlds (def 2), where each computational trace constitutes its >>>> > own little world, causally isolated from the rest. >>>> >>>> Except those computational traces DO NOT constitute little worlds. They >>>> are not causally isolated. The whole function of the computer depends >>>> on them interacting, i.e. interfering coherently. >>>> >>>> >>> It depends on the algorithm. >>> >>> If, as in my neural net example, interference is not used, the many >>> computations are causally isolated, and will remain so (FAPP) once I read >>> the output bits. >>> >>> You seem to want it both ways. "Yes they are many worlds, but they're >>> not entirely or always completely causally isolated, so they're not really >>> separate worlds." >>> >>> >>> You're the one who introduced worlds and little worlds. My point is >>> just that doing computations with lots of qubits doesn't imply there are >>> separate worlds in which the computations happen; in fact it requires the >>> contrary if the computation is to come to a single conclusion. >>> >> >> No disagreement with that, but my point all along is that "many >> somethings" associated with the qubits in the quantum computer, can lead to >> many minds which can have many experiences, when the quantum computer >> executes computational traces which create conscious states. Do you >> disagree with this? >> >> >> No. As far as I know minds are classical like processes in brains. >> > > Quantum logic gates are Turing complete. This means quantum computers can > emulate any classical computation. So in certain algorithms, the > components of the superposition are traces of distinct classical > computations. > > > >> That's why you are never really "of two minds". Superpositions >> corresponding to neurons firing and not-firing decohere far too quickly. >> See Tegmark's paper. >> >> > > I'm aware of it. It's about decoherence times of biological neurons to > disprove the Penrose idea that brains exploit quantum mechanics to somehow > overcome incompleteness. > > The point of using a quantum computer in my example is that decoherence > doesn't happen until after the computational traces have all been realized. > > If I understand your position correctly, you believe the distinct > computational traces exist but that they're not consciousness, because you > postulate decoherence at each step of the computation is necessary? > > Would this not make Wigner's friend into a zombie (or any AI or brain > emulation performed on a quantum computer)? Does my clarification of the > Turing completeness of Quantum logic gates do anything to amend your > opinion? > > > I think that thought must be essentially classical. Otherwise, according > to MWI, we would not be aware of the classical world, but only of the state > vector. It's the same reason Bohr insisted on a classical world for > science to be possible. There must be definite sharable results. So I > think this applies within a single brain as well as between Wigner and his > friends. The interesting question is why are we aware of the projection or > decoherence onto certain bases and not others, and could consciousness be > realized differently? > I agree human consciousness is the result of an effectively classical computation. This is why I insist that the quantum computer, (whose components represent many individual classical computations), can instantiate a multitude of individual brains, each potentially having a unique experience. Quantum computers can emulate any classical computation. If a brain emulated on a quantum computer answers "no" when asked the question "are you conscious?" while the same brain emulated on a Pentium III processor answers "yes" when asked the same question, then you have a violation of the Church-Turing thesis. This is a program that can determine something about its underlying hardware (whether its a classical or quantum computer). If instead, you hold that both emulations answer "yes", then you have a violation of the anti-zombie principle <https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kYAuNJX2ecH2uFqZ9/the-generalized-anti-zombie-principle>. Either consequence is distasteful to me. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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