On 8/8/2019 11:59 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Aug 8, 2019 at 1:24 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/8/2019 3:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wednesday, August 7, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/7/2019 8:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 4:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/7/2019 2:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 2:23 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/7/2019 8:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> This is made most clear in the case of a quantum
computer. Where the
> quantum computer can be viewed as one WORLD (def
1) that contains many
> little worlds (def 2), where each computational
trace constitutes its
> own little world, causally isolated from the rest.
Except those computational traces DO NOT constitute
little worlds. They
are not causally isolated. The whole function of
the computer depends
on them interacting, i.e. interfering coherently.
It depends on the algorithm.
If, as in my neural net example, interference is not
used, the many computations are causally isolated, and
will remain so (FAPP) once I read the output bits.
You seem to want it both ways. "Yes they are many
worlds, but they're not entirely or always completely
causally isolated, so they're not really separate worlds."
You're the one who introduced worlds and little worlds.
My point is just that doing computations with lots of
qubits doesn't imply there are separate worlds in which
the computations happen; in fact it requires the
contrary if the computation is to come to a single
conclusion.
No disagreement with that, but my point all along is that
"many somethings" associated with the qubits in the quantum
computer, can lead to many minds which can have many
experiences, when the quantum computer executes
computational traces which create conscious states. Do you
disagree with this?
No. As far as I know minds are classical like processes in
brains.
Quantum logic gates are Turing complete. This means quantum
computers can emulate any classical computation. So in certain
algorithms, the components of the superposition are traces of
distinct classical computations.
That's why you are never really "of two minds".
Superpositions corresponding to neurons firing and not-firing
decohere far too quickly. See Tegmark's paper.
I'm aware of it. It's about decoherence times of biological
neurons to disprove the Penrose idea that brains exploit quantum
mechanics to somehow overcome incompleteness.
The point of using a quantum computer in my example is that
decoherence doesn't happen until after the computational traces
have all been realized.
If I understand your position correctly, you believe the distinct
computational traces exist but that they're not consciousness,
because you postulate decoherence at each step of the computation
is necessary?
Would this not make Wigner's friend into a zombie (or any AI or
brain emulation performed on a quantum computer)? Does my
clarification of the Turing completeness of Quantum logic gates
do anything to amend your opinion?
I think that thought must be essentially classical. Otherwise,
according to MWI, we would not be aware of the classical world,
but only of the state vector. It's the same reason Bohr insisted
on a classical world for science to be possible. There must be
definite sharable results. So I think this applies within a single
brain as well as between Wigner and his friends. The interesting
question is why are we aware of the projection or decoherence onto
certain bases and not others, and could consciousness be realized
differently?
I agree human consciousness is the result of an effectively classical
computation.
This is why I insist that the quantum computer, (whose components
represent many individual classical computations), can instantiate a
multitude of individual brains, each potentially having a unique
experience.
Quantum computers can emulate any classical computation. If a brain
emulated on a quantum computer answers "no" when asked the question
"are you conscious?" while the same brain emulated on a Pentium III
processor answers "yes" when asked the same question, then you have a
violation of the Church-Turing thesis. This is a program that can
determine something about its underlying hardware (whether its a
classical or quantum computer). If instead, you hold that both
emulations answer "yes", then you have a violation of the anti-zombie
principle
<https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kYAuNJX2ecH2uFqZ9/the-generalized-anti-zombie-principle>.
Either consequence is distasteful to me.
If the quantum computer didn't decohere to a quasi-classcial mixture it
would answer "Yes and no." (to every question).
Brent
Jason
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