On 8/25/2019 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sunday, August 25, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:On 8/25/2019 2:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Sun, Aug 25, 2019, 12:38 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On 8/24/2019 11:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 12:51 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 2:16 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On Saturday, August 24, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > things. > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do you mean > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny that > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the brain > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > disembodied. > > Brent > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) exists in any fundamental sense. Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, etc to the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. The mind is a pattern distinct from any of it's physical incarnations. That does not imply that it can exist without some form of physical realization. While I agree any mind requires an instantiation/incarnation/realization, before we can continue I think we need to clarify what is meant by "physical". For example, do you think there is any important difference between a mathematical structure that is isomorphic to a physical universe and that physical universe?A mathematical structure is a relation between propositions defined by some rules of deduction. This confuses truth with proof.c.f. Pontius PilateIt is static. All change is relative.There is no change in a mathematical structure. Nor in physics. C.f. Einstein.
"I'd rather know some of the questions than all of the answers." A. Einstein Pilate asked a question.
It has no "accidental" or as Bruno would say "geographic" features. Two mathematical structures can be isomorphic precisely because of this. This shows only that there's often many ways of talking about what is fundamentally the same thing.Don't you notice that "fundamentally" is a weasel word, signally that your sentence is strickly false. A Leibniz noted, if two things are the same then they are only one thing. That's what I said.
So if you could (although I think you can't) create a mathematical structure exactly the same as our universe, it would be our universe and it would be physical.
It is impossible that a mathematical and a physical structure be isomorophic. Why?Because physical things have "accidental" attributes and relations.Define accidental. I'm not sure you can define it in such a way that a physical object could have it while a mathematical object could not.
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