> On 16 Sep 2019, at 05:58, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 9/15/2019 6:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> If in H you are multiplied in W and M, but directly killed in M, you >>>> survive in W with probability one. That is why we add p or <>t to []p to >>>> transform the logic of belief ([]p) into a probability logic ([]p & <>t). >>> Suppose you live a few seconds in M. Do you then survive in W with >>> probability 0.5? >> Assuming you do die in M, even after some years, the probability in H to be >> feeling the one in W will be one, assuming you never dies in W. But this >> assumes mortality, and some transitivity of the probability rules, so the >> question is very complex. The probability in H to be W or M, for a short >> time, is one half, but the probability to be in the place where you stay >> for a long time, will be close to one in a sort of retrospective way. >> >> All this comes from a simple fact: absolute-death is not a first person >> experience. There is no entry in the first person diary which mention “I >> died today”. >> >> The difficulty is that the first person renormalise the probabilities all >> the time, and that is why making them transitive leads to paradoxes. > > I think what makes them paradoxical is that you jump around between > subjective probabilities of different persons beliefs.
It works because I take them all, in the relative computationalist way (which is amenable to the mathematics of the diverse form of self-reference). It is the materialist which invokes special selector making them unique. A bit like those who invoke the wave packet reduction in QM. > >> >> Let me try to illustrate. You are in H, just before the WM-duplication. You >> are told in advance that in W you will get a cup of tea, and then be killed. >> In W you get a cup of coffee, and not killed. > > Is that last W supposed to be "M”? Right. Bruno > >> What is the probability (in H) that you will get a cup of tea. It is 1/2. >> But what is the probability, in H, that you will have a long lasting memory >> of having drink a cup of coffee after that experiments: It is 1. In fact, in >> Moscow, you could (although it is psychologically very difficult) still bet >> that “you” will have a memory of having doing coffee, and just an amnesia of >> M and its cup of tea. This also gives some sense that we survive more in our >> kids and in the value we transmit to them, than in bodies and personal first >> person happening. >> >> Now, that renormalisation process is not easy, a bit like in QFT, we get >> infinities which are hard to subtract. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d673b090-1a42-fc42-4abc-68fc09633e9e%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d673b090-1a42-fc42-4abc-68fc09633e9e%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/76E6853D-7661-4100-9136-24BF1E92DA26%40ulb.ac.be.
