> On 19 Sep 2019, at 15:37, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: >>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must >>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed >>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly >>> > argued. What's the argument for such a claim? >>> >>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite >>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE >>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite >>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in >>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such >>> a thing. >>> >>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable >>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into >>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats. Think of the number of >>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a >>> different universe. AG >> >> >> Tegmark missed this? >> >> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good >> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable >> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum >> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure >> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least. >> >> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I >> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any >> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG > > > I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, > indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the > difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, > which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case. > > I don't believe in repeats
That can be shown to be non accessible from the first person view. > and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, That follows easily from the fact that the elementary arithmetical reality emulates all computations, and this infinity many often. You need to study Gödel 1931, or some books, to get this right. The arithmetical reality is Turing universal, and no universal machine can distinguish the arithmetical reality from any other type of reality, from its first person perspective, but that still can test the plausibility of mechanism, by comparing the physics in the head of the (immaterial, arithmetical) machine and what we see. Thanks to QM-without collapse, (and non cloning, non locality, indeterminacy + quantum logic) we can say that up to now Nature confirms Mechanism, and quasi refute Materialism or at lest materialism + consciousness exists. Bruno > just assertions from the usual suspects. AG > > > >> >> As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and >> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the >> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is >> your theory, isn't it? > > It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually > attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame. > > >> If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG > > It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much > mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why > there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the > “many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that > the physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum > mechanics, due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism. Only > by reading Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible confirmation of > the most startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of mechanism: that we are > multiplied "all the times”, and that physics is “only” a statistics on all > relative computations (“seen from inside”). > > Comare the three theory of physics: > > Copenhagen: > SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind on which nobody agree > > Everett > SWE + mechanism > > Your servitor > Mechanism. > > Not only Mechanism explains the quanta (qualitatively and quantatitavely) but > it explains the qualia, and protect consciousness and (first) person of the > materialist velleity to dismiss them. > > Bruno > > > > >>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light >>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one >>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be >>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years >>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is >>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics >>> is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite. >>> >>> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for finite >>> time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature of the >>> CMBR. AG >>> >>> >>> Is there a copy of you >>> <https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf> >>> >>> > Morevover, I don't believe a universe of finite age, such as ours which >>> > everyone more or less agrees began some 13.8 BYA, can be spatially >>> > infinite. >>> >>> I see no reason in principle why something can't be finite along one >>> dimension and infinite along another dimension. >>> >>> In general, one can of course have some dimensions finite and others >>> infinite. But if our universe is finite in time since the BB, 13.8 BY, its >>> spatial extent must be finite, since that's how long its been expanding. AG >> >> I agree with Grayson here. (Accepting a lot of premises, like the BB is the >> beginning of the physical reality, which I doubt). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5a270b8e-3bf2-4d34-b0e7-4e0daa3cebce%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5a270b8e-3bf2-4d34-b0e7-4e0daa3cebce%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e558a41c-3784-4298-80be-52a5e6f45f7f%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e558a41c-3784-4298-80be-52a5e6f45f7f%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7a2a5811-8c93-48a9-a64d-932ea16a4d70%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7a2a5811-8c93-48a9-a64d-932ea16a4d70%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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