> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:46, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: > > > On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: > > > On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> a écrit : > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: >>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must >>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed >>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly >>> > argued. What's the argument for such a claim? >>> >>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite >>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE >>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite >>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in >>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such >>> a thing. >>> >>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable >>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into >>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats. Think of the number of >>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a >>> different universe. AG >> >> >> Tegmark missed this? >> >> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good >> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable >> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum >> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure >> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least. >> >> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I >> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any >> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG > > > I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, > indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the > difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, > which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case. > > I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, > just assertions from the usual suspects. AG > > Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in 1920x1080 pixels then > in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", > once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your > consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones > at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity of > them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at the > correct level and below it). > > Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, > and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a > continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how > many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any > repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG > > If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not > uncountable. > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the > necessary existence of copies. AG > > Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is finite, > countably infinite or uncountably infinite? > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable > universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG > > It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite spaces > within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and holographic > principle.
It would even violate the assumption that the physical reality is Turing universal. To negate mechanism, we need a small finite non Turing universal universe, but that leads to big difficulties by itself. You need some magic. Bruno > > Jason > > > > > > <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > Virus-free. www.avast.com > <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > <x-msg://490/#m_7809505840903152737_CAH=2ypVLGJwvoq=f6XM0hYSNmH26-kQtw4t88idsKffPz=xmSA@mail.gmail.com_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/997f6fad-8042-45ec-b1a6-67a20d36a7a4%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/997f6fad-8042-45ec-b1a6-67a20d36a7a4%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiuoKWLnTMTfTjEEBymUrEX7VpzDG-64Vj69nM_UfUp-w%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiuoKWLnTMTfTjEEBymUrEX7VpzDG-64Vj69nM_UfUp-w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20748A22-0A3C-4B99-A986-8505FCD92EF4%40ulb.ac.be.
